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This Article originated in my perusal of a new casebook on com-
mercial transactions.' A portion of the book is derived from and concen-
trated my attention on two articles: Security Interests and Bankruptcy
Priorities: A Review of Current Theories by Alan Schwartz,2 and Se-
cured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors by Thomas Jackson
and Anthony Kronman.3 Both articles apply economic analysis to the
t Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Chester A. Rohrlich
Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University. Professor Kripke is a member of the
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, but the views expressed
herein are solely his own.
1 A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1982).
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz, A Review]. Pro-
fessor Schwartz has recently returned to the subject in Schwartz, The Continuing Puz-
zle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. Rv. 1051 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz,
The Continuing Puzzle]. See infra note 80.
3 Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88
YALE L.J. 1143 (1979). Professors Jackson and Schwartz have responded to the pre-
sent Article in Jackson & Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A Reply to
Professor Kripke, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 987 (1985). For the present I shall merely
comment (a) that this response is principally concerned with that favorite topic of eco-
nomic polemicists, the other fellow's methodology; but (b) that it deals only superfi-
cially and with gross distortions with the substance of the present Article, see infra
notes 35, 40, 80; and (c) that it deals scarcely at all with the substance of my criticisms
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questions why chattel security is permitted to exist and whether its pro-
tections should be changed under article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) and the Bankruptcy Code.4
Professors Jackson & Kronman set out to explore the justification
and proper scope of the purchase money priority under U.C.C. § 9-
312.5 As a preliminary matter, they consider whether any chattel secur-
ity is justified. They conclude that taking security is economically effi-
cient and, therefore, justified because security serves as a monitoring
device and can reduce the total monitoring cost for all creditors.6 I
agree with the conclusion, but not with their reasoning.
Professor Schwartz questions the priorities accorded to security in-
terests under the Bankruptcy Code. As a preface, he also considers the
justification for chattel security. He rejects Jackson & Kronman's reli-
ance on monitoring costs because he sees no need for monitoring in the
case of short-term loans, yet he finds that security is nevertheless
taken.7 After canvassing other economic theories for possible explana-
tions, he concludes that the taking of security cannot be pronounced
either efficient or inefficient and, therefore, that inadequate grounds ex-
ist to tamper with the present law of secured credit."
There is nothing wrong with the questions these articles ask. In-
deed, I always ask my classes essentially the same question: why should
the law allow discrimination in favor of certain creditors, through the
device of contractual security, while invalidating discrimination in favor
of other creditors through contractual arrangement with the debtor for
preferred payment? 9 This question becomes more difficult to answer as
broadly encompassing security arrangements, such as after-acquired
property clauses, 10 future advance clauses,1 and the "floating lien,' 2
of their respective articles.
4 11 U.S.C. §§ 101.151326 (1982).
5 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1144.
6 See id. at 1158-64.
7 See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 9-13.
8 See id. at 33, 37.
9 The UCC does permit contractual discrimination against a creditor (in other
words, subordination) by contractual arrangement with it. See U.C.C. § 9-316 (1978).
1 After-acquired property clauses permit a secured creditor to obtain a security
interest on property acquired by the debtor after the credit is extended. See U.C.C. § 9-
204(1) & comment 1; see also id. § 9-108 & comment 1 (validating interests in after-
acquired property).
11 Future advance clauses permit a creditor to obtain a present security interest
for future advances of credit contemplated by the security agreement but not yet made.
See U.C.C. § 9-204(3) & comment 5.
The term "floating lien" refers to a security interest that, by reason of after-
acquired property and future advance clauses, "floats" over all of the debtor's inventory
and receivables and possibly its equipment. It may include all of a debtor's assets, pres-
ently owned or later acquired. While the debtor is free to dispose of its inventory and
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come into wider usage. Professors Countryman and Coogan, for exam-
ple, have expressed their disapproval of increasingly expanded security
interests.13
Since both Jackson & Kronman and Schwartz conclude by propos-
ing to leave the law unchanged for the present, I have no call to take
issue with their conclusions. Rather, I write because these articles pro-
ceed in a world of academic reasoning reminiscent of the cloister and
unfounded on any discussion of the factual world of commerce. They
do not display an understanding of the role played by the system of
secured financial credit in developing a distribution system for the great
outpouring of goods that has occurred in the past century. In my opin-
ion, they are unconvincing for that reason."'
sometimes obsolete equipment, the lien "floats" over proceeds and replacements. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-204 & comment 2, 9-205 & comment 1, 9-306.
13 See Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 COM. L.J. 269
(1970). Professor Countryman states, "[M]any practitioners and bankruptcy referees
tell me . . . more and more bankruptcy cases emerge with every scrap of the bank-
rupt's property covered by some sort of a Code security interest . . . That means, of
course, that nothing will be distributed to any unsecured creditor, with or without pri-
ority." Id. at 269. Professor Countryman goes on to say that "[w]hatever may have
been thought in an earlier day, it is now established that the bankruptcy power is
adequate to prevent the secured creditor from reaching his collateral either immediately
or at all." Id. at 280.
Professor Coogan has indicated concern about the ease of creating broadly encom-
passing security interests against users, as distinguished from inventory and receivables
financing, made possible by notice filing and the validation of after-acquired property
clauses and future advance clauses. See Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV. L.
REv. 838, 879-80 (1959).
I raised the same question myself but was overruled during the very early stages of
the drafting of the UCC, even before Professor Coogan joined the group working on
secured transactions. Subsequently, I have come to believe that, although notice filing
presents dangers to an uninformed person, one who is aware of how the UCC works
has ample means of protecting herself. See Kripke, UCC Brief No. 5: Recapitulation of
Priority Problems Under the Uniform Commercial Code, PRAc. LAW., Mar. 1967, at
23, 25-27. In my opinion, notice filing for user financing has not worked badly. The
convenience of having a uniform filing procedure in all situations outweighs the few
cases where the expectations of incautious persons have been disappointed.
14 If the most vocal wing of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies (CCLS)
were to take notice of this Article, they would no doubt "trash" it as an example of
purported legal reasoning used "instrumentally" to support current economic and fi-
nancial arrangements. See, e.g., Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1984). The
message of this Article is that the legal structure of secured credit developed to make
possible mass production and the distribution of goods, and I would hope that the Law
and Society wing of CCLS would find merit in that analysis. See Schlegel, Notes To-
ward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Criti-
cal Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REv. 391, 393-97 (1984). I unashamedly think that
these developments have increased human welfare, much as I deplore Archie Bunker-
ism, some of the other pop-culture aspects of our society, and the social disequilibrium
that has resulted from the rapid rate of change in this century. My nonphilosophic,
nonjurisprudential position is that neither critical legal studies nor law and economics
has as much relevance to human welfare as patient, incremental amelioration of law
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I suspect, however, that these articles are not much different from
other articles that apply the techniques of law and economics to the
commercial world.15 I am concerned because these abstractions, and re-
liance on secondary sources for an understanding of the business world,
are very different from the techniques that Robert Braucher and I ap-
plied as drafters of the present form of UCC article 9, and very differ-
ent from the kind of reasoning that we submitted to the Review Com-
mittee composed of practicing lawyers, judges, and academics of an
older generation. 6 My present colleagues and I on the Permanent Edi-
torial Board continue to apply to the UCC "conventional" reasoning of
the sort that these articles reject in favor of economic analysis and belit-
tle as "the accepted wisdom." '
My concern is not based on any broad opposition to the applica-
and economic organization and patient correction of imperfect efforts, abuses, and inef-
ficiencies in governmental intervention.
"6 Other authors have leveled similar criticisms at law-and-economics scholarship.
See, e.g., Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Bankruptcy: The Spherical Chicken, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 66 (commenting on Meckling, Financial Mar-
kets, Default and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Au-
tumn 1977, at 13). Meckling argues that if the consequences of bankruptcy are made
less onerous, more debtors will elect bankruptcy, lending will cost more, and lenders
will pass on these increased costs to borrowers. See Meckling, supra, at 22-27. Under
these assumptions, bankruptcy reform would be self-defeating. Shuchman points out
that neitfer of Meckling's two premises is empirically supported: borrowers' decisions
to enter bankruptcy do not follow the model of economic rationality, and lenders do not
always pass on to borrowers increases in their cost of lending. See Shuchman, supra, at
76-91; see also S. MAITAL, MINDS, MARKETS AND MONEY: PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1982) (pointing out psychological factors that de-
termine behavior but are ignored by economists).
Other lawyers, both academics and practitioners, have pointed out the unrealistic
assertions of economists in the area of corporate and commercial law. For example, the
lawyers who drafted AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984), stated that
the assertions underlying some of the recent economic literature on agency costs "ap-
pear highly questionable in the context of publicly held corporations." Id. § 3.02 re-
porter's note at 75. The articles referred to are Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory
of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and
Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Fama & Jensen, Separation of Owner-
ship and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976). Professor Jensen has asserted to me that the ALI authors provide no anal-
ysis or evidence to support their comment. Letter from Michael Jensen to Homer
Kripke (Oct. 14, 1984). But that observation misses the point of the ALI criticism,
which is that the authors of the articles do not know how the world works in fact. I am
personally satisfied that the ALI authors speak from a wider background in the real
corporate world than the economists.
10 See Foreword to 1972 Official Text and Comments, reprinted in UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, 1978 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS at xxxvii-xxxiii (9th ed.
1978).
17 Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 2. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra
note 3, at 1146 n.16; Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 2, 3, 7.
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tion of economic analysis to law. Elsewhere I have strongly advocated
the application of economics to regulatory problems and have criticized
the Securities and Exchange Commission for not incorporating into its
own system the conclusions of economic studies of capital markets.,
Conversely, Schwartz and Jackson & Kronman have demonstrated a
sound ability to use conventional legal analysis in their other writings. 9
Their rejection of that approach in the two articles considered here sug-
gests a point of view later articulated by Professor Edmund W. Kitch:
[T]he principal "intellectual foundation" of law and econom-
ics was its success vis-a-vis the competition. Yet there has
been no discussion of the competition. The reason is that
there is none that offers anything like the range of methods,
insights, and institutions that law and economics has, nor is
there any competition that has been associated with a com-
parable quantity and quality of useful scholarly work on
law.
20
This point of view is a cause for alarm in the older generation, and
calls for a response.
In this Article I will defend most of secured chattel financing by
using conventional legal reasoning based on realistic observation of the
commercial world.21 I will also make some adverse comments on the
Schwartz and Jackson & Kronman articles. I do not undertake to pass
18 See H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE at xv, xx, 88, 96-97, 275 (1979); Kripke, Where Are We on
Securities Disclosure After the Advisory Committee Report?, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 99, 101-
02, 107-14, 121-23 (1978).
" See, e.g., D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY (1984); A. SCHWARTZ & R. ScOr, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1982); Jack-
son & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buyer, 85 YALE L.J. 1 (1975); Kronman,
Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351 (1978); Schwartz, The Enforceability of
Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 26 J.L. & ECON. 117 (1983).
20 Kitch, The Intellectual Foundations of "Law and Economics," 33 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 184, 196 (1983).
21 I confess to a prejudice in favor of secured chattel financing going beyond that
of most conventional teachers of commercial law. I have a vested intellectual interest,
having practiced in the field for 22 years as inside and outside counsel for secured
lenders, and having taught, written, lectured, and consulted in the field during my
subsequent years as professor of law. I was one of the early advisors to the first drafters
of UCC article 9, see Mentschikoff, Reflections of a Drafter: Soia Mentschikoff, 43
OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 544 (1982), and the primary drafter of the present, 1972 version,
see Dedication to Professor Homer Kripke, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 11, 14 (1981) (re-
marks of Grant Gilmore). Currently, I am a member of the Permanent Editorial Board
for the UCC. As a member of the National Bankruptcy Conference, I participated
actively in the drafting of the new Bankruptcy Code, and resisted efforts to undo by
that Code the support that the UCC gives to secured creditors. See Kripke, Some Re-
flections After a Quarter-Century of the Uniform Commercial Code and on the Incep-
tion of a New Bankruptcy Code, 87 CoM. L.J. 124, 127-28 (1982).
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judgment on whether more useful discussion could come from different
applications of economic analysis, for I am at most a wader in the shal-
lows of the sea of law and economics, hardly competent to discuss it
broadly.22
In Part I, I will state my own analysis of the justification and need
for secured credit in the chattel field, which I think will support most
present practices. In Part II, I will analyze the Schwartz and Jackson
& Kronman articles, justifying my remarks in this preface about their
uselessness in explaining secured credit. In Part III, I will point out
some of the areas of secured credit that are not fully explained by my
discussion in Part I and suggest that research along conventional lines,
rather than by economic analysis, may provide a more productive basis
for passing judgment on security in these areas of credit.
I. A TRADITIONAL FACT-ORIENTED JUSTIFICATION FOR SECURED
CREDIT ON PERSONAL PROPERTY
A. Most Secured Credit Is in the Nature of Purchase Money
Financing
My essential starting point is the obvious rule that, unless other-
wise agreed, tender of payment is a condition of the seller's duty to
deliver the goods. This is codified in U.C.C. § 2-511(1). Section 2-
507(1) states the equally obvious converse: tender of the goods is a con-
22 When the study of law and economics came dramatically to public attention
with the publication of R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1972), my
modest formal college training in economics was already more than forty years out of
date. Yet I have since read much on the economics of capital markets and somewhat at
random in other areas. In connection with this Article I have read the recent massive
symposia, Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 485
(1980); A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 811 (1980); The
Place of Economics in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (1983). I have also
refreshed myself on several law-and-economics articles and compilations, especially EC-
ONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES (H. Manne ed.
1969); THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1979);
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION (R. Posner & K.
Scott eds. 1980); THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS: READINGS IN THE
THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (H. Manne ed. 1975).
In addition I have read three recent surveys of law and economics: C. GoETz,
LAW AND ECONOMICS (1984); A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND Eco-
NOMICS (1983); Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Founda-
tions of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETHICS 649 (1984). While these demon-
strate that economics can add much to legal analysis, they do not provide any support
for the subject articles' failure to achieve an understanding of the factual context before
attempting to apply economic reasoning. In contrast, Judge Richard Posner of law-and-
economics fame recently decided a company's suit against its auditors for missing a
fraud by managers by looking to the factual reality.of who would benefit by a recovery.
See Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 455-57 (7th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 133:929
ECONOMICS AND COMMERCIAL LAW
dition of the buyer's duty to pay. Many present-day secured credit ar-
rangements developed directly from this basic principle.
When credit entered the picture, it was historically an easy step to
the concept that, despite physical surrender of the goods, the seller re-
tained title until paid. This was the origin of the conditional sale con-
tract, which was initially thought to be different from a chattel mort-
gage loan and did not require the same publicity by filing.2"
Although we are long past that primitive point, the concept re-
mains that security taken for purchase money is not only legitimate, but
also entitled to favorable treatment. 24 This recognition showed up in
early cases protecting purchase money security against floating mort-
gages2 5 and against the federal tax lien26-originally, in the latter case,
without a filing requirement. Similarly, in the 1962 edition of U.C.C.
§ 9-313 the purchase money security interest in fixtures taken before
accession to the real property had priority even without any filing
against prior real estate creditors.27 Here too, we now require filing,28
but the purchase money security interest continues to receive favorable
treatment in the present version of the UCC. 9
Recognition of the purchase money priority of a seller's security
interest leads readily to the further recognition that the same rights
must be accoided to a bank or other financial institution that, at the
time of the transaction, provides the buyer with funds to pay off the
seller-as provided in U.C.C. § 9-107(b). •
Many types of chattel security not directly covered by the UCC's
narrow definition of purchase money are nevertheless essentially
equivalent to purchase money security for purposes of this discussion.
Thus, a loan for refinancing purchase money security interests does not
technically fit the definition of purchase money, but logically should be
given the same recognition in the law. In fact, there is already a close
analogy in the UCG: the construction mortgage is recognized as a
purchase money type of loan and accorded favorable treatment, and
23 See G. BOGERT, COMMENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES § 54, 2A U.L.A. 73
(1924) (withdrawn 1943).
24 See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 23-7 (2d ed. 1980). This point is acknowledged in Jackson & Kronman, supra
note 3, at 1144 & nn.5-7.
' See, e.g., United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362, 364-65
(1871); Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637, 640-41 (1914); see also Gilmore, The Purchase
Money Priority, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1333, 1338-70 (1963) (reviewing development of
after-acquired property interest and the purchase money priority).
2' See United States v. Lebanon Woolen Mills Corp., 241 F. Supp. 393, 396
(D.N.H. 1964); W. PLUMB & L. WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 71-72 (2d ed. 1967).
17 See U.C.C. § 9-313 (1962) (amended in 1972).
2" See U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (1978).
" See U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-312(3), 9-312(4), 9-313(4)(a).
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refinancing of the construction mortgage receives the same treatment.30
Finally, much long-term financing has as its purpose the acquisi-
tion of new facilities by the debtor. The security taken may not fall
within the definition of a purchase money security interest or the defi-
nition of a refinancing mortgage. As financing intended to facilitate the
acquisition of new assets by the debtor, however, such a loan deserves
to be treated like the purchase money security interests for purposes of
our inquiry into the legitimacy of secured credit.
Surprisingly, neither Schwartz nor Jackson & Kronman seem to
realize that these priorities represent a recognition that one who con-
tributes new assets to the debtor is entitled to be paid for them and
should not be required to give up a hold on the assets until paid. In-
stead, much of the discussion in these two articles proceeds on the as-
sumption that what the secured creditor gets is taken away from un-
secured creditors and, therefore, does not increase either the debtor's or
the creditors' welfare."1 Seemingly, these authors view secured credit as
a zero-sum game.
None of the authors explicitly recognizes that in purchase money
situations the secured party has added to the assets of the debtor, and
that since the purchase money priority requires the secured creditor's
funds to be traced into new assets, the secured creditor and the debtor
have taken nothing away from the unsecured creditors. The most re-
markable example of this blind spot appears in Professor Schwartz's
article. A hypothetical prospective debtor with $100 of assets (and pre-
30 See U.C.C. § 9-313(6)-
" Both articles are replete with remarks that seem to assert that what the secured
party obtains in added safety from security the unsecured creditors necessarily lose. For
example, Jackson & Kronman state,
[I]t may seem unfair that a debtor should be allowed to make a private
contract with one creditor that demotes the claims of other creditors from
an initial position of parity to one of subordination.
. . . When a debtor grants a security interest to one of his creditors,
he increases the riskiness of other creditors' claims by reducing their ex-
pected value in bankruptcy.
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1147 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 1154
("If the debtor grants C1 a security interest in his property, he reduces the expected
value of C2's recovery in the event of the debtor's insolvency.").
Professor Schwartz writes, "When a creditor becomes secured, . . . the chance
that the debtor's unsecured creditors will collect their debts correspondingly de-
creases .... [T]he unsecured creditors will charge higher interest rates because the
pool of assets available to satisfy their claims has shrunk." Schwartz, A Review, supra
note 2, at 7. Similarly, he states, "[Slecurity increases the costs of unsecured creditors
by as much as it reduces the costs of secured creditors; in consequence, firms have no
incentive to issue it." Id. at 9-10. In addition, "[tihe existence of security raises the
expected cost of default for unsecured creditors by reducing the available asset pool and
thus creates incentives for these parties to monitor more extensively." Id. at 10.
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sumably of net worth) borrows $200 from two creditors (one of whom
takes security) and immediately thereafter still has only $100.2 The
concept that loans increase the borrower's assets is never mentioned.
We cannot assume that business losses eliminated the $200 of new as-
sets, for the example asserts that the firm "has $100 in available assets
and both creditors assume this value to be stable over time.""3 Professor
Schwartz then attempts to demonstrate mathematically that the total
cost of interest to the debtor is unchanged whether security is taken or
not. Any interest expense saved by granting one -creditor a security in-
terest correspondingly increases the unsecured creditor's risk and,
therefore, increases the interest rate that the unsecured creditor will
charge.34 No doubt Professor Schwartz could have made his mathemat-
ical point using believable figures, but when accompanied by remarks
suggesting that the debtor's assets are not increased, the article shows a
lapse of understanding that demands correction.
Similarly, Jackson & Kronman seem to assume a set of facts in
which the debtor starts with various assets and two unsecured creditors;
one creditor then obtains security without furnishing additional consid-
eration.3 5 On this set of assumptions it is undoubtedly true that what
the one creditor gains, the other loses. But it is unrealistic to suppose
that the losing creditor would accept this calmly. Such a transaction
would be a voidable preference if it occurred within the preference vul-
nerability period and quite likely would be upset by the filing of a
82 See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at .8-9.
33 Id. at 8.
4 See id. at 9.
35 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1147-48.
In their reply, Professors Jackson and Schwartz erroneously assert in a footnote
that I imply a disapproval of all secured financing that is not purchase money financ-
ing. See Jackson & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 994 n.25. Seemingly, they deduce this
from the fact that I support secured purchase money financing because it adds to the
assets of the debtor, and that I contrast it with the case in Jackson & Kronman, supra
note 3, at 1147-48, which assumes that an existing unsecured creditor takes security in
existing assets without contributing any new asset to the debtor. Of course, there is no
such implication. Obviously a loan of new money adds to the assets of the debtor, and
may be justified, for it makes available to the pool of creditors a new asset to replace
the one that is partially withdrawn by being taken as collateral. Jackson & Schwartz
should have understood this from my note 60, infra, and from my text following note
30.
A curious feature of Jackson & Schwartz's discussion in this area is their assertion
that "[n]o one denies that a debtor can use borrowed funds to increase its net wealth."
Jackson & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 994. This may be true, but their mentors Modi-
gliani and Miller certainly come close to saying that it is inefficient for a firm to bor-
row at all instead of maintaining a one-class capital structure, without borrowed
money. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text. Smith & Warner, infra note
128, say this expressly. Where does this leave Jackson & Schwartz's assertion?
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bankruptcy petition and invalidation of the preference. 6 At any rate, in
my experience the kind of preference envisioned by Jackson &
Kronman does not happen often enough without being upset to pose
any general question of economic efficiency.
7
The more usual case can be represented by the following simpli-
fied set of facts:
Automobile Dealership
Balance Sheet 1
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth
Cash $20,000 Unsecured Creditor A $40,000
Auto Repair
Equipment 80,000 Owners' Equity 600
TOTAL $100,000 TOTAL $100,000
It will be noticed that in this situation it is not clear how the business
will operate. The owners have no inventory to sell.
Let us suppose that -the owners now buy an inventory of
automobiles, and start to sell them. The owners do not have the cash to
pay for their purchase of inventory. Their supplier, B, insists on a se-
curity interest in the automobiles to secure the unpaid purchase 'price.
36 See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
17 See Darlin & Soloman, Baldwin-United Is Forced to File for Chapter 11,
Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 1983, at 3, col. 1. The article describes the company's filing of a
voluntary petition after creditors filed an involuntary petition. The latter petition had
been filed to stop the running of time that would have made the discriminatory taking
of collateral by pre-existing bank creditors invulnerable to a preference attack.
For a similar purpose, I myself, representing General Electric Credit Corporation
and two other creditors, filed against Continental Vending Corporation one of the few
involuntary petitions ever filed under Chapter X of the old Bankruptcy Act.
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Our set of facts now looks like this:
Balance Sheet 2
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth
Cash $20,000 Unsecured Creditor A $40,000
Inventory
(automobiles subject
to security
interest of B) 60,000 Secured Creditor B 60,000
Auto Repair
Equipment 80000 Owners' Equity LO
TOTAL $160,000 TOTAL $160,000
From this oversimplified illustration we may draw a few conclu-
sions, none of which is explicitly recognized by Professors Schwartz
and Jackson & Kronman. First, in some industries suppliers customa-
rily demand security in goods sold until they are paid. Second, when
security is taken for new consideration, the pool of assets available for
the unsecured creditors is not necessarily diminished. The old un-
secured creditors have not given up any claim to assets on which the
new secured creditor has a security interest, because the old creditors
had no claim to the assets until the debtor negotiated to obtain them by
meeting the supplier's terms. The new creditor furnished additional
assets in return for the security. Sometimes the transaction may be
three-cornered: a financial creditor, such as a bank, may finance the
acquisition of inventory while the supplier is paid in cash. The net
result, however, is unchanged.
Note that the Owners' Equity is unchanged, as are .the unencum-
bered assets. On the face of things, Creditor A is the only one who need
resort to them, for B can be satisfied out of the inventory or its pro-
ceeds. Admittedly A's risk is somewhat increased: if the new assets
prove insufficient to satisfy the debt to B, then B will attempt to recoup
this deficiency by competing with A for the remaining pool of assets.
But this would be equally true if B had made its loan unsecured.
The above example assumes that the owners obtained their inven-
tory entirely on credit. If, instead, they made a 20% down payment
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($12,000), then the situation would be as follows:
Balance Sheet 3
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth
Cash $8,000 Unsecured Creditor A $40,000
Inventory
(automobiles subject
to security
interest of B) 60,000 Secured Creditor B 48,000
Auto Repair
Equipment 80,000 Owners' Equity LO
TOTAL $148,000 TOTAL $148,000
This is also a case where apparently nothing has been taken from
the unsecured creditor, A. A still has access to assets of the same value
as before, which now include $12,000 equity in the encumbered collat-
eral instead of $12,000 in cash. B, however, has first claim on that
equity to cushion any decline in the value of the inventory. In other
words, the secured creditor is "more equal"'3 8 as to the equity in the
collateral, and "equally equal" with the unsecured creditor as to unen-
cumbered assets for any deficiency. But this potential increase in the
unsecured creditor's risk is a far cry from the seeming contention of the
two articles that whatever the secured creditor gets is necessarily taken
away from the unsecured creditor.
More importantly, recall that on Balance Sheet 1 the company
had no inventory and no business. On Balance Sheet 2, the company is
in business and can perhaps prosper-eventually paying both creditors.
This may or may not happen, but the possibility belies the zero-sum-
game assumptions of Schwartz and Jackson & Kronman. They do not
explicitly recognize that by increasing the debtor's resources everyone,
including the unsecured creditors, may be better off.
Unsecured creditors of small businesses are typically suppliers, not
lenders. They have a substantial interest in developing a prospering
and active customer able to buy from them and pay them and able to
generate cash with which to take trade discounts on its payables. Thus,
when some creditors demand security, there is room for Judge Posner's
conception of economics as considering whether each of the parties is
making a reasonable calculation of its own best interests.39 This should
apply both to the debtor who grants security and to the unsecured cred-
38 Cf. G. ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 148 (1944) ("All animals are equal, but some
animals are more equal than others.").
" See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (2d ed. 1977).
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itor who acquiesces when another creditor takes security.
The authors would answer, of course, that they recognize that ev-
eryone involved may realize economic advantages when the owner bor-
rows or buys on credit, as long as the return from investment of the
credit proceeds is more than the interest charge. They would insist,
however, that it does not follow that the new credit must be secured.
Thus, I argue next that in most situations involving secured credit, the
credit could not have been obtained without granting security.4"
B. The Need for Credit and Its Sources
My principal purpose in writing this Article is to show that one
cannot practice economics in a vacuum of fact. To do this, I concentrate
on the commercial realities of some principal business contexts in which
security is taken for credit and, in particular, on the financing of the
distribution of goods.41
The increased mechanization of our society has resulted in con-
sumer and other user satisfactions being embodied in durable goods. A
decision to purchase such goods involves a commitment to purchase sev-
eral years of satisfactions in advance. For example, purchase of an au-
tomobile may be compared to the purchase of a bus ticket good for five
years, or purchase of a washing machine may be likened to contracting
for a person's laundry services for five years. There would be relatively
few instances in which a buyer could afford to buy this long-lasting
package of satisfactions at once. The installment payment contract is a
device for permitting the user to pay for the satisfactions more closely to
when they are realized.
The durability of goods is also largely responsible for a wide-
spread feature of our system of manufacturing and distribution-the
working capital shortage of small business. With the breakthrough of
mass production after the turn of the century, most small businesses
found themselves insufficiently capitalized and unable to invest the re-
quired working capital in inventory and receivables. The basic problem
is that a business has to pay its supplier of inventory-even if the sup-
40 Professors Jackson and Schwartz accuse me of confusing the question whether
money should be borrowed with the question whether borrowing should be secured. See
Jackson & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 994. They could make this charge only by ignor-
ing the text above, and the remainder of Part I.
41 I have not attempted any methodical field survey. No doubt this Article will be
criticized as relying on facts that are anecdotal or based on the distillation of only one
man's experience. That is true, but this criticism would apply with even greater force
to the Schwartz and Jackson & Kronman articles, which marshal no factual evidence
whatsoever. I, at least, write from 40 years of practical experience in the world of
commercial finance.
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plier extends some credit-before the business succeeds in selling the
inventory and in collecting the resulting credit that it ordinarily extends
to the next person in the chain of distribution. Even if this extension of
credit by the business were for the same length of time as the credit
extended to the business by its supplier, the receipt of the cash will lag
behind the maturity of the payable by the time needed for sale and
collection of the account. The problem is especially severe in hard goods
fields where the credit extended to the user is typically an installment
contract payable over eighteen months to five years, and .the cash collec-
tion lags behind the maturity of the payable by many times the period
of the supplier's credit. Indeed, aggregate receivables may constitute
many times the value of inventory carried at any one time. Small busi-
ness, therefore, has to obtain credit beyond supplier credit and, with
minor exceptions, such additional credit can come only from financial
capital. Each supplier at every step in the chain of distribution ex-
tending credit generates a receivable, not cash, with which to pay its
own accounts payable. The supplier may be as pinched for cash as its
customer and must find a financial entity to "cash" its own receivables.
Thus, ultimately a large part of the working capital of small business
comes not from equity or from suppliers' trade credit but from financial
lenders.42
As consumer satisfactions are increasingly embodied in larger
purchases such as automobiles or appliances, and as industrial and
commercial labor is increasingly replaced or supplemented by ma-
chines, chattel paper43 becomes a type of receivable created by sellers in
ever greater amounts. The credit may last three to five years, with
credits from the sales of several years ago still partly outstanding.
Working capital pressures on the dealers and distributors of these con-
42 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial and Busi-
ness Statistics, 58 FED: RESERVE BULL., May 1972, at Al, A56-57 (Financial institu-
tions accounted for 99% of all automobile credit extended in March 1972.).
The Federal Reserve's 1983 statistical survey shows consumer installment credit in
July 1983 of $358,020 million. Of the total credit, $4356 million was held by gasoline
companies and $27,900 million by other retailers, leaving 91% held by various financial
lenders. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial and Busi-
ness Statistics, 69 FED. RESERVE BULL., Dec. 1983, at Al, A40. I have been unable to
construct similar figures from the data in the Federal Reserve Bulletin for installment
financing of nonconsumer users, and it has not seemed worthwhile to press the point
further.
Total consumer noninstallment credit was $85.9 billion at the end of 1982. Id. at
A40 note. Much of this undoubtedly involves department store charge accounts and the
like. It is not separately indicated how much was financed for the stores through loans
from banks and other financial lenders.
' Chattel paper is "a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obliga-
tion and a security interest in . . . specific goods . . . ." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b).
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sumer hard goods and all types of equipment are enormous and require
much financing whether by loans or by purchase of the receivables.
The purchase of receivables-principally accounts and chattel pa-
per-from the seller is just as much a form of working capital financ-
ing as is lending on the security thereof.""
Financing of specific items of inventory and of receivables is typi-
cally short-term. However, when the inventory is sold, or the receivable
collected and the financing retired, the debtor has to buy new inventory
and renew the cycle. One loan for inventory, or one financing of a re-
ceivable, is replaced by another. Although the individual commitment is
short, the relationship is not. Because items of inventory move in and
out, the creditor can keep contractual commitments short-term, gear the
amount of credit to the inventory or receivable needs of the moment,
and retain some freedom of action as circumstances change. But the
debtor's need for financing is so overriding that the lender cannot
lightly close it off and refuse to renew or to extend replacement credit
without precipitating a liquidation costly to both parties. Thus the legal
form of short-term financing does not present the full picture; the need
for inventory or receivables financing is just as much a long-term re-
quirement as the need for financing of fixed assets like buildings and
machinery.45 This is contrary to the Schwartz and Jackson & Kronman
articles' characterization of inventory and receivable financing as sub-
ject to fewer risks by virtue of its short term.46 Financing of short-term
current assets carries the same risk of financial deterioration and "mis-
behavior" of the debtor as contractually long-term financing.
Although the above discussion focuses on small businesses, the
same considerations frequently apply to large businesses as well. The
necessary investment in inventory carried expands with business
growth, especially when the goods produced become more complicated,
of better quality, and more diverse. Larger units of business prove to be
equally short of working capital and are forced to resort to financial
lenders to supplement their funds.
Trade credit4' is a frequent source of short-term funds for busi-
nesses, but much of what appears to be trade credit is ultimately finan-
44 See infra text accompanying notes 169-70.
45 See Kripke, Current Assets Financing as a Source of Long-Term Capital, in
CONFERENCE ON CORPORATION LAW AND FINANCE 74-77 (1951) (U. Chi. L. Sch.
Conf. Series No. 8), revised in 36 MINN. L. REV. 506, 511-14 (1952).
46 See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1159 & n.58; Schwartz, A
Review, supra note 2, at 3-4, 11-13. But see Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 12.
4' Trade credit is the credit extended to buyers during the period between the
receipt of the purchased goods and the time of actual payment. See J. VAN HORNE,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND'PoLICY 487 (5th ed. 1980).
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cial credit. The most obvious example is the practice of factoring in
textiles and related fields. Here, the textile mill or other supplier in the
chain of distribution extends trade credit in the first instance. But the
mill does not ordinarily extend the credit unless a financial factor has
approved it in advance and agreed to buy the resulting receivable from
the mill without recourse. Thus, this is really financial credit and only
momentarily trade credit in form.
Similarly, when an automobile dealer or other dealer in hard
goods sells a car or appliance on installment terms, the credit is in the
first instance supplier or trade credit, and in this instance it is secured
credit. Yet the dealer almost always sells the resulting chattel paper to
a bank or finance company, and the credit is ultimately carried long
term by financial, not supplier, credit.
The same result occurs, although not as obviously, when a seller
chooses not to sell its receivables to a financial entity, but to borrow on
the security of the receivables up to seventy-five or eighty percent of the
face amount. Here too, while the credit remains in form supplier credit,
the supplier could not extend credit unless it was "cashing" its receiv-
ables through a loan of nearly the entire amount from a financial
entity.
These examples illustrate that, in short, most participants in our
present distribution system are largely dependent on the availability of
financial capital.
Financial capital, however, is free to move where it chooses; it
need not necessarily be engaged in loans to-finance the distribution of
goods. Instead, it can be invested in the securities or commodities mar-
kets, used to develop real estate, or used to engage in any other business
activity. If it is used to engage in financing the distribution of goods,
lenders can largely dictate the terms to which both debtors (manufac-
turers or dealers) and suppliers, who are the-bulk of unsecured credi-
tors, have to agree. 48 For reasons that we will later explore,49 the
lender's terms will often require security.
For instance, despite statements to the contrary by Schwartz50 and
Jackson & Kronman,5 1 even much trade credit is actually secured
credit. When an automobile or appliance manufacturer extends secured
48 Yet the financial capitalist's bargaining power does not present the whole story.
Unsecured creditors are advantaged when a business stays in operation (as in the ele-
mentary balance sheet examples above); when it is able to buy from its suppliers, pay
them promptly, and thus relieve their burden of carrying receivables; and when, as
frequently happens, it becomes profitable enough to graduate to unsecured credit.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 68-79.
50 See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 4 n.10. But see id. at 12, 14.
51 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1158-60.
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credit directly or through wholly owned subsidiaries to enable dealers
to purchase inventories of automobiles or appliances, the transaction
must be characterized as secured trade credit.52 General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation, General Electric Credit Corporation, Westing-
house Credit Corporation, and numerous other "captive" finance com-
panies in the automobile and appliance field have long extended such
credit. The same is true to a lesser extent of manufacturers of all sorts
of business equipment, with credit extended by the manufacturers or
their wholly owned finance subsidiaries. Historically, there was a sig-
nificant period when inventory credit to dealers of Ford and Chrysler
cars, and those of the former independent automobile manufacturers,
was extended by independent finance companies. As these companies
withdrew from the field, the manufacturers had to create subsidiary
finance companies to supply secured inventory credit for their dealers.53
Moreover, even this secured trade credit is ultimately financial
credit. The manufacturers' wholly owned finance subsidiaries are
merely financial intermediaries through which financial credit is routed
to their dealers. The reason that these manufacturers do not extend the
credit directly, but use finance company subsidiaries, is that they can
borrow much more in the financial markets by segregating their receiv-
ables from their industrial business and by heightening the quality of
their receivables by obtaining security for them.
A manufacturing company should appropriately borrow not more
than thirty-five to fifty percent of its capitalization." If the receivables
arising from sales, or the debt incurred to finance the receivables, were
left in the manufacturing operation, this principle would severely limit
the manufacturer's use of credit. By segregating the receivables into a
separate subsidiary, thus giving lenders the first claim on them, manu-
facturers can obtain vastly greater funds.55 The segregation of receiv-
52 Finance companies such as these accounted for over 25% of all automobile
credit granted in 1982. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finan-
dal and Business Statistics, 69 FED. RESE.RvE BULL., Dec. 1983, at Al, A40.
58 I was Assistant General Counsel of C.I.T. Financial Corporation and wit-
nessed its withdrawal and the withdrawal of Commercial Credit Corporation in the
1950's. The Ford and Chrysler sales finance subsidiaries were activated to step into the
breach.
" See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
UThe ability to borrow such large amounts depends on the quality of the receiv- -
ables and, in particular, on whether and by what collateral they are secured. Receiv-
ables secured by hard goods inventories or consisting of chattel paper arising from the
distribution of these goods can command borrowings of eight to ten times the amount of
the equity capital behind them. These were common multiples available to the major
sales finance companies, both factory-controlled and independent, when I was active in
the field in the 1950's. The multiples have since increased along with the increased
multiples of bank deposits to bank capital. See Gadient, Funding the Captive Finance
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ables in a separate subsidiary is the practical equivalent of the manu-
facturers borrowing on the security of the receivables segregated in the
finance subsidiary.56
C. The Need for Rapid Credit Decisions and the Use of Security
Our enormous manufacturing system for equipment and consumer
goods depends on a distribution system that permits rapid salts on
credit at the point of distribution without extended delays involved in
the passing of credit and incidental legal matters. One need only con-
trast the delays and transaction costs involved in closing a sale of real
estate to a householder with the procedures for buying an automobile
or even a major piece of equipment. The latter can occur at the dealer's
place of business, on standard forms, and with the credit decision fre-
quently involving no more than a telephone call. Compare this with the
elaborate business of negotiated contracts, Search of title, and adjourn-
ment to lawyers' offices or bankers' closing rooms that is characteristic
of real estate transactions. If we had to close contracts for the sale of
automobiles, refrigerators, or even industrial equipment using the
mechanics of real estate loans, we could never have achieved our pre-
sent distribution system. Similarly, when a bank makes a loan in sub-
stitution for a dealer's extension of credit, it has to pass credit expedi-
tiously, without the leisure of a detailed credit investigation of either
the consumer or the industrial borrower.
The key to this ability to consummate credit sales rapidly is the
system of secured credit. The lender's risk is reduced by the taking of
security. If the loan is properly structured with a down payment ade-
quate to overcome the depreciation that occurs when a new object be-
comes used and to keep ahead of future wear and tear, the risks to the
seller or lender on most items of durable goods will be relatively small,
given the resale value that can be realized readily on repossession. This
reduced risk is taken into account in determining whether to make the
loan and in establishing the amount of the down payment, the length of
the period of credit, and the extent of the credit investigation.
Company, in AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, MANAGEMENT BULLETIN No.
89, CAPTIVE FINANCE COMPANIES: THE WHY AND How OF CREDIT SUBSIDIARIES 6
(1966); Wallen, Montgomery Ward Credit Corporation: A Captive Finance Company,
in AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, supra, at 30, 35.
Lesser amounts of financing, but still multiples of the equity, are available to fac-
toring companies and companies making loans against receivables in other contexts.
Still lesser multiples of equity are available to the small loan companies, whose receiv-
ables are essentially unsecured and, by their nature, less trustworthy than the other
kinds mentioned.
56 See infra text accompanying notes 163-74.
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In the case of consumer credit, the consumer is seldom a good
balance-sheet risk.57 Her principal assets are household goods, which
would be almost worthless on an execution sale and in many states are
exempt from execution sale except in purchase money situations.58 The
consumer's principal other "asset" is her job. One can check on the
existence and duration of the job by telephone, but this gives no assur-
ance that the job will continue. The lender places additional reliance on
the salvage value of the goods sold subject to a security interest.59
Beyond making it possible to grant more installment credit at the
point of sale, the effect of security is enormous in keeping the sale pri-
marily a commercial transaction and not a banking event. Whether the
buyer is a consumer or a small business, passing credit in the absence
of security would be a time-consuming and expensive job. I do not
mean to suggest that credit is not checked in dealer-secured sales, but
with security in the goods, credit checking is much simpler, more rapid,
and less consequential. The transaction costs are lower. The dealer can
usually check the credit adequately in time for prompt delivery of the
goods and with reasonable assurance that a bank or finance company
will finance the chattel paper."0
Similar considerations arise in the context of loans to retailers and
wholesalers for inventory and receivables. The size of these borrowers
may be sufficient to permit a reasonable amount of careful credit check-
ing, and continuous contact with the same borrowers may make credit
checking worthwhile. The amounts involved, however, frequently far
exceed the borrower's net worth. This is particularly true in the case of
dealers in automobiles and major consumer appliances. Under these
circumstances the amounts of credit necessary for carrying inventory
could not be extended to the average dealer were it not for security in
the goods. For the same reason, the necessary amount of financing of
' This is particularly true if her household goods are valued at resale value in-
stead of cost. See Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1, 26-28 (1969) (discussing D. CAPLOvrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE 116
(1963), in which Caplovitz puzzles over consumers' ability to obtain credit despite their
seeming insolvency, as he calculates it).
58 See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 5.112, 5.116, 7 U.L.A. 773, 775-76
(master ed. 1978).
" Despite the diminished resale value of consumer goods after long use, the tak-
ing of security and the consequent ability to repossess in the event of default or breach
of warranty by the buyer adds a significant amount of protection against the risk of
immoral buyers who never intended to pay.
"0 Although I have been speaking of purchase money situations that meet the
standards of U.C.C. § 9-107, many secured capital loans are subject to similar com-
ments. The value and availability of the collateral taken provides a simple basis for
credit that might not otherwise be available and certainly would not be available with-
out extended delays.
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receivables could not be extended without security in the receivables.
This reasoning includes those methods of financing receivables that
take the legal form of a purchase instead of a secured loan."1
The importance of this point cannot be overemphasized. It is fair
to say that a large part of the financing of our distribution system for
capital goods and consumers' durable goods depends on the existence of
an economic and legal structure making possible both the rapid exten-
sion of secured credit for the purchase of goods and the availability of
financial lenders to hold the credit. The readiness of Schwartz and
Jackson & Kronman to overlook differences among situations in which
credit is extended and to disregard the necessities of our distribution
system at basic stages of their analysis suggests that they miss funda-
mental characteristics of our economy. 2
D. Reasons for the Favored Position of Secured Credit
An essential aspect of granting security, from the viewpoint of
both the secured creditor's interests and society's interest in plentiful
credit and rapid credit decisions, is the favored treatment of secured
creditors in the law of bankruptcy and creditors' rights. This treatment
inspires frequent discussion of fairness, distributive justice, and eco-
nomic efficiency.
Security is desirable because it makes available summary legal
procedures that bypass the slowness with which the mills of justice
grind. Creditors are entitled to peaceful self-help repossession, 3 instead
of the cumbersome stages of service of process and complaint, trial,
judgment, and execution. In bankruptcy, secured credit opens up such
possibilities as reclamation," adequate protection, 5 freedom from bear-
ing a portion of the expenses of administration66 and of priority
claims, 17 and other advantages. No doubt these procedural advantages
are included in the unfairness indictment against secured credit. Sub-
61 The purchase without recourse of unsecured receivables in "old line" factoring
does not fit comfortably within the assertions made in this Article. See infra notes 78-
79, 178-80 and accompanying text.
62 See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1152 n.40.
63 See U.C.C. §§ 9-503, 9-504; see also, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l
Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1973) (Self-help repossession procedures provided
by the California Commercial Code do not constitute state action and thus are not
subject to constitutional limitations.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 554(b), 725 (1982); 2 CoLLiER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL
554.03 (L. King 3d ed. 1985); 3 id. at 725.01.
65 See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982).
6 See 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra note 64, at 506.05.
67 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1982); 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra note
64, at 506.05.
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stantively, there seems to be little doubt that at the time of default we
are in a zero-sum game. When creditors seek to collect, the secured
creditor's advantage is the unsecured creditor's disadvantage. In bank-
ruptcy, where, uniquely, litigants bear the expense of the judicial sys-
tem, what the secured creditor escapes the unsecured creditor suffers
more heavily.
Looking to the facts of commercial transactions, however, one finds
that the types of financing usually undertaken on a secured basis often
involve situations of severe risk. Only the unique opportunity for rapid
repossession that security offers can sufficiently mitigate these risks.
This section next considers in more detail certain credit risks in financ-
ing our system for distribution of goods that are ameliorated by the
advantages of secured credit.
1. The Special Risks of Inventory and Receivables Financing
a. Inventories
As noted above, inventories of hard goods may represent several
times the distributor's and dealer's net worth. 8 A merchant with this
loan ratio is operating on a high break-even basis and a slight slacken-
ing in business or other adversity can put the merchant in a position of
loss or a cash shortage. Inventories are mercurial: stocks of finished
goods and, to a lesser extent, of raw materials are readily salable.
Under sufficient inducement, a dealer can make them disappear rap-
idly. The dealer may sell off the inventory dishonestly."9 More likely,
the dealer may put on a sales drive, sell the inventory to buyers in
ordinary course, and either divert the proceeds-for example, by using
them for payroll or general expenses-or decamp with them. The se-
cured party's claim to the goods will in most cases be lost,7" as will any
claim to the proceeds.
7 1
It is naive for Jackson & Kronman to assert that the debtor has
more opportunity for misbehavior on long-term loans.7 2 Short-term in-
ventory and receivables financing is subject to real, not merely theoreti-
cal, risks. A large portion of inventory can rapidly disappear, represent-
ing a loan exposure far exceeding the debtor's capital .7  Firms
"' See supra text following note 60.
69 UCC article 6 was drafted primarily against this contingency. See U.C.C. § 6-
101 comment 2.
7 See U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
"' See U.C.C. §§ 9-306, 9-308, 9-309.
71 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1159 & n.58.
"' See supra text following note 60.
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experienced in inventory financing guard against this risk by having
"floor checkers" monitor the dealer's inventory, examining it periodi-
cally and demanding an immediate accounting for missing items on
which the loans have not been paid.
I will make some adverse comments below on the importance that
Schwartz and Jackson & Kronman attach to monitoring. 4 The impor-
tant point here, however, is that monitoring that can usefully supple-
ment loan terms and covenants depends on security, that is, property
rights, which enable the secured party to act fast when trouble is dis-
covered. The remedy of self-help is vital to make monitoring worth-
while and to stop the loss. 7 5 A higher interest rate or a shorter term
cannot compensate for these kinds of risk.7 6 The risk is there the day
that the extension of credit is made, and only the power of a security
position makes these "jumbo risks" bearable.
b. Chattel Paper
The chattel paper risk is much the same as the inventory risk. If
the inventory loan is not paid upon sale, the claim to the paper as
proceeds of inventory may be lost to another creditor under U.C.C. § 9-"
308 or 9-309. Only the property right of security in or purchase of
chattel paper enables the secured party to move swiftly.
c. Accounts-Indirect Collection
Accounts financing through the indirect collection method-in
which the debtor collects the accounts and makes payment to the credi-
tor-is subject to risks of a different nature. First, the existence of the
account is evidenced primarily by an invoice unilaterally prepared by
the seller, objectively verified neither by an account debtor's signature
on a note, nor by direct collection of the account from the account debt-
ors. There is, therefore, a substantial risk of fraudulent invoices and
debtor-generated pseudo-payments which remain undetected until the
house of cards collapses. As with inventory and chattel paper financing,
the risk is there from the first day. Apart from the risk of totally fraud-
ulent invoices and collections, there are the risks of prebilling (writing
7" See infra text accompanying notes 131-38.
7 In pre-UCO days, the prevailing form of inventory financing was a trust re-
ceipt under the then existing Uniform Trust Receipts Act. See generally Kripke, Inven-
tory Financing of Hard Goods, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 580. Under the terminology of that
Act, the creditor took ownership from the supplier and "entrusted" the goods to the
dealer. The entrusting concept supplied the legal basis for self-help on default. See
UNIF. TRUST RECEIPTS AcT § 6, 9C U.L.A. 247 (1957).
76 See infra text accompanying notes 80-95.
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invoices and borrowing on them before the goods are shipped); consign-
ment wrongly described as a sale creating an account; an informal un-
disclosed understanding with the account debtor that the seller will ac-
cept return of the goods, thus terminating the account; and numerous
other ingenious devices. The greatest risk is that as the debtor's finan-
cial position weakens, collections will be diverted to other business
needs or even to personal needs. This kind of financing necessitates that
the lender maintain an internal crew of field auditors to review the
borrower's books periodically. Here again, only a security interest or a
property right puts the lender in a position to monitor effectively.
d. Accounts-Factoring
Factoring is the purchase of accounts receivable outright-the ac-
count debtor pays the factor directly, and the factor is without recourse
to the seller of the account.7 7 The likelihood of fraud is somewhat re-
duced, but not eliminated, by the direct contact of the factor with the
account debtors and by the generally higher credit ratings attributable
to the use of this arrangement in more traditional types of business .7
Thus, factoring presents a more equivocal case for security.
7 9
2. The Need for Security Is Not Obviated by Higher Interest Rates
Professor Schwartz argues that the risk against which creditors
seek security could as well be mitigated by increased interest charges.8"
7 See A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONs 684 (1982).
7' Even in factoring, frauds can occur. A recent instance is described in RCA Unit
Sues Ex-President and 3 Firms, Alleging Fake Billings of Over $15 Million, Wall St.
J., Aug. 24, 1983, at 6, col. 1.
79 See'infra text accompanying notes 178-80.
SO Schwartz does not explicitly state this in his article. He does, however, chal-
lenge the assertion that higher interest is not a substitute for security. See Schwartz, A
Review, supra note 2, at 7 n.23, 29 n.50. He explicitly assumes that, when some credi-
tors have security, unsecured creditors will raise their interest rates higher than other-
wise. See id. at 7.
Professor James White rebutted Professor Schwartz's views on this point by ana-
lyzing some of the psychological and other motivations for the differential appraisal of
risk in the taking of security. See White, Effiiency Justifications for Personal Property
Security, 37 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1984). In particular, he pointed out the institutional
concerns of regulated bank lenders as against unregulated companies, and the differ-
ences in risk aversions of lending officers (as distinguished from lenders), who face the
risk of losing their jobs for having made bad loans. See id. at 491-502. Professor
White's paper is excellent. Its only fault lies in trying to meet Professor Schwartz on
the level of academic economics, with corrections only by some realism about the lend-
ers' appraisals of risk, instead of looking to the realities of the need for secured lender
capital in the distribution process in which secured chattel credit chiefly occurs.
Professor Schwartz rebutted White in Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle, supra
note 2, at 1060-1065, stating that "such risk aversion cannot exist if credit, capital, or
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However, in a classic study of fundamental security analysis, Graham,
Dodd, and Cottle ("Graham & Dodd") conclude that abnormally high
interest rates cannot compensate for high risk."1 These authors deny
that there is any precise mathematical relationship between yield and
risk82 and that actuarial calculations are practicable; instead they be-
lieve that yield and risk are incommensurable.
8 3
In opposition to their own position, Graham & Dodd cite two
studies by W.B. Hickman showing that over long periods low-grade
bonds produced a higher net return than high-grade bonds. 4 Even
"junk bonds" with the lowest or no ratings find a ready market in the
hands of knowledgeable underwriters and investors. A recent study by
Professor Edward Altman confirms the Hickman study by concluding
that although rates of default and of losses are greater for junk bonds
than for higher-rated bonds, the net rate of return for the junk bonds is
higher.8 5 The post-World War II abandonment of security in the pub-
lic industrial bond market seems also to disprove Graham & Dodd's
managerial service markets function perfectly." Id. This response succinctly illustrates
why Professor Schwartz's writing in this field is, in my opinion, of so little value: he
offers new cloistered abstractions to overcome White's pragmatic factual observation.
Schwartz's view is enlarged upon in Jackson & Schwartz, supra note 3. These
authors are inordinately slow in learning the principle first enunciated by Fabricius ab
Aquapendente (1533-1619) (a forerunner of Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation of
blood): "Let all reasoning be silent when experience gainsays its conclusion." D.
BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS 367 (1983). This principle is a useful corollary to the
theme of this Article. Contrary to the assertion by Jackson and Schwartz that I have
not even attempted to show the fruitlessness of their search for hypotheses about market
behavior to shed light on secured lending, see Jackson & Schwartz, supra note 3, at
990, I later discuss the market experience with secured credit. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 150-62. This experience presumably obeys the laws of market behavior.
81 See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD, & S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 320-22 (4th
ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as GRAHAM & DODD].
82 See id. at 320.
See id. at 322. Superficially, this assertion contradicts more recent findings of a
correlation between returns and risk as defined in the Sharpe-Lintner-Mostyn capital
asset pricing model. See, e.g., Modigliani & Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Re-
turn: Concepts and Evidence (pts. 1 & 2), FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1974, at 68,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 1974, at 69. Evaluating this contradiction is beyond the
scope of this paper.
" See GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 81, at 321 (citing W.B. HICKMAN, STATIS-
TICAL MEASURES OF CORPORATE BOND FINANCING SINCE 1900 (1960); W.B. HICK-
MAN, CORPORATE BOND QUALITY AND INVESTMENT EXPERIENCE 14-15 (1958)).
85 See E. Altman & S. Nammacher, The Default Rate Experience on High Yield
Corporate Debt 1, 17, 21 (March 1985) [on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review]; see also Sandler, Study Finds Much Higher Default Rate for 'Junk
Bonds' than for All Issues, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1985, at 7, col. 1 (discussing the
Altman study, but also reporting contentions of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., the
principal underwriter of junk bonds, that Altman had overstated defaults and losses on
these bonds); cf. Sandler, Recent Rally in Junk-Bond Prices May Hide Trouble for the
Sector, Some Analysts Say, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1985, at 63, col. 3 (reporting increas-
ing demand, increasing risks, and diminishing returns for junk bonds).
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thesis.86
Yet it does not follow that the experience of the bond markets can
simply be carried over into the types of commercial lending discussed in
this Article. The unimpressive difference in the frequency of bank-
ruptcy or other defaults in the lower-rated bonds as against the higher-
rated public bonds suggests that the lower ratings may be due more to
insufficient track records, insufficient knowledge or extreme cautious-
ness by the rating agencies, or current temporary adverse circumstances
of the issuers, than to the actual, or even perceived, existence of a sub-
stantial risk of default.
Graham & Dodd also reject the theory of safety through collateral
securing the bonds. They contend that safety is not measured by a spe-
cific lien but depends on the ability of the issuer to meet all of its obli-
gations.17 Admitting the validity of the traditional view that security
makes debt independent of other business risks, they comment that this
approach would be "excellent" if it worked."' They contend that it does
not work, however, because of shrinkage in the value of the collateral
and difficulty and delay in asserting rights to the collateral.8 9
But Graham & Dodd's concerns about the feasibility of this "ex-
cellent" approach do not properly apply to short-term security interests
in inventory and receivables, or to middle-term credits held outside the
public securities markets and protected by security interests in con-
sumer or industrial goods. In these contexts shrinkage in the value of
the collateral is part of the lender's necessary calculations. Resale val-
ues are excellent for many consumer goods, such as automobiles, and
for many types of inventory or equipment. Due to the availability of
self-help remedies, delays in enforcement are much briefer than those
faced by public bondholders, who must rely on judicial foreclosures and
rights of redemption for real property in many states,90 or experience
the delays of reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code.
86 Cf. McDaniel, Are Negative Pledge Clauses in Public Debt Issues Obsolete?,
38 Bus. LAw. 867, 880 (1983) (suggesting that even negative pledge clauses as a sub-
stitute for security are obsolete).
8" See GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 81, at 310.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 310-11.
90 For the complicated history and final repeal in Illinois of a twelve-month pe-
riod of redemption from foreclosure sale for the mortgagor and an additional three-
month period for creditors, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 77, §§ 18-20 (Smith-Hurd 1966 &
Supp. 1983) (repealed 1982).
Certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, however, provide countervailing diffi-
culties in the enforcement of the secured creditor's expedited self-help remedies. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 361-65 (1982); see also Kripke, supra note 21, at 127 (discussing possible
tension between the treatment of security interests under the UCC and under the
Bankruptcy Act).
19851
954 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The fundamental reason for the inapplicability of Graham &
Dodd's view of security to the commercial context is the difference be-
tween the public bond issues with which they were concerned and
asset-based commercial lending by a single lender. Bond issues cover
large plants in which going-concern value is an essential element and in
which reorganization, not liquidation, is usually appropriate in the
event of default. In contrast, asset-based financing by private lenders
frequently may not involve reorganization after default, and the liqui-
dation value of collateral is a real protection-indeed, a principal pro-
tection-against the sudden risks described above.91 Professor Schwartz
refers to this distinction, but fails to draw from it any support for se-
cured credit financing."2
An additional reason for the inapplicability of the relationship be-
tween risk and yield found in public bond markets is that many credi-
tors are not free to choose their borrowers. Their credit extension starts
with a sale, and the seller who needs to extend trade credit in order to
make a sale cannot lightly turn away buyers who will not or cannot
pay interest rates high enough to compensate for credit risk.93
Other considerations defeat Schwartz's- hypothesis as well. Con-
trary to his basic assumptions, the interest rate on secured financing is
often necessarily higher than the prime rate to the best borrowers be-
cause even with security some commercial loans carry more risk and
expense to administer than large loans to the best borrowers.94 There
are limits to the amount of interest that a debtor can pay before a loan
arrangement becomes impractical both for financial reasons and for le-
"' See supra text accompanying notes 68-79.
" See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 25-27.
" Professor Schwartz has asserted that the seller's calculations of the profit on the
sale are independent of the profit and risk on the credit extension. Letter from Alan
Schwartz to Homer Kripke (Aug. 4, 1983). Separate analysis is no doubt desirable, not
only to simplify economic analysis, but also to help the businessperson understand her
business. But it cannot be true that the business permits separate calculations of the
profitability of credit extensions to be decisive when credit extension is necessary to
make a sale. We had a notable example of this in 1983, when General Motors and
Ford advertised financing rates of 10.9% per annum. The rate was attractive because it
was commonly known-that this was below rates available elsewhere at the time and
was indeed at times below their own prevailing money cost. The prime rate was 11%
for a good deal of 1983. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finan-
cial and Business Statistics, 71 FED. RESERVE BULL., Mar. 1985, at Al, A23. The car
companies obviously thought it worth taking some loss on the financing in order to help
their dealers sell the cars. Two other examples come readily to mind. First,- my own
experience as counsel to a large automobile inventory financer, not factory affiliated,
showed that such firms might charge less than a remunerative rate on inventory loans
in expectation of making up the loss from the profit on retail chattel paper, which
would be sold to them to pay the inventory loans. Second, textile mills have assumed
credit risks that factors rejected in order to make sales. See infra note 179.
" See supra text accompanying notes 68-79.
[Vol. 133:929
ECONOMICS AND COMMERCIAL LAW
gal reasons such as usury laws. Unlike Schwartz's hypothetical busi-
ness that can freely choose between secured and unsecured credit, real
businesses in need of credit to operate may have no alternative to se-
cured financing."
I have not asserted in this Part that all of secured chattel credit is
defensible as necessary to our distribution system: there are anomalies
in need of further exploration. But before turning to these in Part III, I
shall consider in Part II the uselessness of exploration using the type of
economic analysis exemplified in the articles by Schwartz and Jackson
& Kronman.
II. THE SCHWARTZ AND JACKSON & KRONMAN ARTICLES
A. Abstract Logic as a Key to a World of Conflicting Interests
Jackson & Kronman seek to apply economic analysis to the prob-
lem of the purchase money priority.98 They reject two standard author-
ities of traditional legal scholarship 7 because the conclusion of those
works "rests upon the questionable premise that a debtor's existing.
creditors wish to* cripple him financially."98 Jackson & Kronman also
contend that the these authorities do not adequately explain the tracing
requirement of the purchase money priority.99
Jackson & Kronman's perception of the assumption that creditors
wish to cripple their debtors rests on casual but admittedly infelicitous
language used by Professors Braucher and Reigert suggesting that
through an after-acquired property clause a creditor acquires a position
"which would enable him to take advantage of the debtor." 100 All that
this means, however, is that a security agreement with an after-
acquired property clause would, but for the priority the law gives to
purchase money security interests, permit the creditor to refuse to make
additional loans against new collateral and at the same time to refuse to
95 Even if the debtor could pay additional interest charges, many secured lenders
may prefer not to be known as interest gougers and would rather have the safety of
security than an extra reserve for bad debts.
96 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1146 n.16.
1 See id. at 1145 & n.9 (criticizing R. BRAUCHER & R. RiEGERT, INTRODUC-
TION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1977) and J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1st ed. 1972)).
Id. at 1145.
"See id.
100 R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSAC-
TIONS 464 (1977), quoted in Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1145 n.9. No such
language is used by Professors White and Summers, although Jackson & Kronman
also cite to them. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1145 n.9 (citing J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 97, at 914).
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give such consent for subordination as would permit the debtor to get
the needed loan from another creditor. The purpose of such a clause is
not to cripple the debtor financially but to enable the creditor to moni-
tor the debtor and to prevent it from overextending itself to what the
creditor perceives as the latter's detriment. Since the debtor may see the
situation differently than the creditor, the law steps in to limit the po-
tential misuse of the after-acquired property clause by permitting the
debtor to give purchase money security with priority over the earlier
security interest arising from the after-acquired property clause. 01
Jackson & Kronman question the function of the tracing require-
ment as a condition of the purchase money priority. They laboriously
conclude that it is necessary to preserve the basic "first in time," "first
in right" system of property priorities.10 2 This seems to me obvious. As
the name suggests, a purchase money priority applies only to collateral
that has been purchased with the credit for which it is security. This
requirement limits the purchase money priority to those additional as-
sets into which the funds provided by the new lender can be traced.
Thus, this priority should not prejudice the original secured party, or,
indeed, any unsecured parties.
But perhaps the point is obvious to me only because I have a long
UCC memory. In the very early days of drafting what became article 9,
Professor Austin Wakeman Scott suggested that money-tracing litiga-
tion (which he had encountered in the law of trusts) could be avoided
by eliminating the tracing requirement. He would have extended the
purchase money priority to all credits extended to the debtor within ten
days of the debtor's acquisition of an item of property. Those working
on the topic dutifully tried to draft the idea, but it generated so many
conflicting purchase money priorities that we became entangled in the
necessity of setting up a hierarchy of priorities within the purchase
money priority. At that stage I persuaded Karl Llewellyn, the Chief
Reporter, that Scott's idea had to be abandoned.
A better question deserving an answer is one not posed by Jackson
& Kronman: why does article 9 contain three separate purchase money
priorities, and why does each one have different conditions? This ques-
tion goes to the heart of my objection to the Schwartz and Jackson &
Kronman articles, and to my challenge to Professor Kitch's assertion
that the economic analysis of law has no competition.'0"
The main priorities section of article 9, U.C.C. § 9-312, describes
two purchase money priorities. First, under section 9-312(4) a purchase
101 See U.C.C. §§ 9-312(3), 9-312(4).
1'2 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1175-82.
102 See supra text accompanying note 20.
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money security interest in collateral other than inventory has priority
over earlier perfected security interests. The purchase money security
interest has priority even against subsequent security interests arising
in ignorance of its existence and before it is perfected, provided that the
purchase money security interest is perfected no later than ten days
after the debtor received the collateral. Why would anyone create a
priority that can defeat innocent intervening lenders through a subse-
quent perfection? What logical rigor or economic model could explain
it?
Quite clearly, this is a case of legislative accommodation to resolve,
to the extent possible, two conflicting but legitimate interests. On the
one hand there is the interest of a subsequent lender to be protected
against undisclosed and unperfected prior interests. On the other hand
there is the need of our economy to have a distribution system by which
secured credit can be extended at the point of sale, with a reasonable
time to perfect a resulting security interest with priority. Neither theory
nor abstract logic could dictate or predict the relative importance of
these considerations or predict how the conflict would be resolved.
Could rigorous logic determine that ten days was the right period?
The second provision, section 9-312(3), provides a purchase money
priority in the acquisition of inventory. Here, a different set of condi-
tions applies. There is not the same need for prompt sales to users and,
therefore, no opportunity is afforded to defeat an intervening security
interest by a later filing within ten days. Filing must have occurred by
the time the debtor gets the collateral. Even filing is not enough-the
earlier secured party must be given direct notice of the purchase money
financing to be given priority. This notice enables the secured party to
avoid making a fresh advance against new inventory, as its financing
arrangement may contemplate. The notice is good for five years.
Why the requirement of actual notice when the collateral is inven-
tory but not when the collateral is something other than inventory?
Because the drafters believed that the likelihood of the earlier secured
party making advances in the case of inventory newly acquired by the
debtor is greater than in other cases. Perhaps this could be empirically
verified, but the vast diversity of situations covered suggests not. In any
event, its advantages could not be rigorously proven in retrospect be-
cause the statute itself may have altered commercial behavior and pre-
cluded further inquiry.
The third purchase money priority, U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a), gives
under certain conditions a purchase money finander of chattels that be-
come fixtures priority over a prior mortgagee of real estate. The doc-
trine of accession gives the mortgagee a right to the chattels equivalent
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to the right afforded by an after-acquired property clause in a security
agreement when the chattels become part of the real estate, that is,
when they become fixtures. This situation is analytically equivalent to
that addressed in section 9-312(4), the noninventory priority discussed
above. Indeed, in its present form, section 9-313(4)(a) is modeled on
section 9-312(4). The two sections differ in that the holder of the
purchase money security interest is not here granted the leeway to take
ten days for filing and still defeat an intervening real estate interest.
What logic could explain this difference between these two sections?
Peter Coogan and I spent the equivalent of two full weeks work-
ing out the present form of section 9-313 with a joint committee repre-
senting the Section on Real Property of the American Bar Association
and the American Land Title Association. It would not overstate mat-
ters to say that we had there a clash of two cultures: the world of real
estate and the world of commerce. The techniques of anthropology
might have been more suited to handle the conflict than economics or
logic."0" Anyone who knows the ritual of a real estate closing-with
someone stationed in the Recorder's office to advise the persons present
at the closing by telephone that there have been no last minute record-
ings of relevant instruments-can understand that the reaL estate world
could not conceive of acquiescing in a system in which outstanding but
later-filed purchase money security interests could outrank real estate
interests acquired at the closing."0 5 But by our assessment, the commer-
cial lawyers did not give up any legitimate needs of our distribution
system, for we felt that there is generally not the same need for simplic-
104 In fact, the best tool to understand this situation may be the techniques of
alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation and negotiation, with their emphasis
on accommodating the legitimate interests of all parties as much as possible. For exam-
ple, Fisher and Ury's emphasis on principled negotiation might seem to provide a logi-
cal theoretical structure. See, e.g., R. FISHER & W. URY, GETING TO YES 86-88
(1981); H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982). See generally
Alternate Dispute Resolution in the Law Curriculum, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229 (1984);
Wheeler, Book Review, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 326 (1984) (reviewing H. RAIFrA, supra).
Principled negotiation techniques may be of only limited usefulness in situations where
both parties have principled but conflicting positions that cannot be measured as right
or wrong. In this situation an emphasis on mediation to arrive at mutual gain may be
more appropriate. See R. FISHER & W. URY, supra, at 73. This is the technique that
we used in drafting article 9 of the UCC.
'05 Dissatisfaction of the real estate world with the original section 9-313 of the
UCC had led to refusal to enact that section in California and other states. This situa-
tion was destructive of uniformity and was one of the principal reasons that the Review
Committee for Article 9 and two Reporters were appointed in 1966, starting a process
which culminated in the 1972 amendments to article 9. See Report No. 3 of the Perma-
nent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, reprinted in UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, 1978 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS at Xxxiii (9th ed. 1978);
Foreword to 1972 Official Text with Comments, reprinted in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, 1978 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS, supra, at xxxvii.
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ity and expedition in the sale of goods intended for installation on real
estate as there is in other cases. Again, there was no way that abstract
reasoning, economic theory, or rigorous logic could have led to the ad-
justment of that situation.1 6
B. Another Purchase Money Puzzle
Throughout the Schwartz and Jackson & Kronman articles it is
assumed that what the secured creditor gets in security is taken from
the unsecured creditors.107 Others, such as Professor Countryman, have
bewailed the lot of the unsecured creditor who finds on the debtor's
bankruptcy that the secured creditor's interest covers all of the debtor's
assets.10 8 The most obvious example of this situation is the supplier
who has delivered inventory to the debtor on unsecured credit but finds,
on the debtor's bankruptcy, that all inventory is encumbered in favor of
a secured lender. Yet it would have been easy for the supplier to avoid
this situation by taking a purchase money security interest in the inven-
tory that it supplied under U.C.C. § 9-312(3). Contrary to several inti-
mations in the Schwartz article,"0 9 the cost would have been trifling.
If their hypothesis were correct, Professors Schwartz and Jackson
& Kronman, as well as Professor Countryman, should have predicted
that the suppliers would frustrate the secured lenders by invariably tak-
ing purchase money security interests with priority. These authors do
106 These limitations of abstract economic theorizing have been pointed out by Ira
Millstein, a distinguished practicing lawyer with a scholarly bent:
Economics, like other social sciences, can be used improperly by the courts
(and everyone else). The danger is especially great whenever particular
economic theories become faddish and are then propounded as beguiling
concepts to avoid any further thinking about and looking at the facts.
"Economics is not constitutive, it is a constructed logic, at best an 'as
if' model of how some resource distributions would be made if individuals
acted in a specified 'logical' way. . . . [Tihere is no intrinsic order, there
are no 'economic laws' constituting the 'structure' of the economy; there
are only different patterns of historical behavior."
Oliver Wendell Holmes' axiom is as true today as when it was writ-
ten in [The Common Law]: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience." Economics is but a specially useful form of logic-it
cannot supplant the experiences that are the stuff of which the law is
made.
Millstein, In Court, Use of Economic Theories Can Blur the Facts, Legal Times, Nov.
28, 1983, at 9, 13 (footnote omitted) (quoting Bell, Models and Reality in Economic
Discourse, in THE CRISIS IN ECONOMIC THEORY 72 (D. Bell & I. Kristol eds. 1981)).
107 See supra note 31.
108 See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 13, at 269, 280.
109 See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 9, 12, 23, 27.
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not discuss this point or consider what might be learned from the fail-
ure of such a prediction-for in fact the prediction would have failed.
Much inventory is supplied on unsecured credit."'
The reason for the failure of the prediction lies in the fact that
taking security will delay payment to the suppliers. If the supplier
takes a purchase money security interest on inventory, no financial
lender will lend on the already encumbered inventory. If the supplier's
security interest in the inventory carried through to the receivable with
priority, the outside financer would not be able to lend on the receiva-
ble, and as a practical matter the supplier could not get paid until the
receivable was paid. Even if the accounts financing was in place first,
the accounts financer could not safely continue financing if later
purchase money inventory financing would carry through to the ac-
counts with priority."' Thus the supplier's hope of prompt payment
depends on the availability of inventory and receivables collateral for
financing from financial lenders. As a practical matter, while some sup-
pliers do take security interests in the inventory supplied, they do not in
general attempt to inhibit accounts financing, because it is in their own
interest to permit that financing to go forward and supply the funds
with which they can immediately be paid."'
An unsecured supplier will on occasion appear to have been
harmed when its debtor becomes insolvent and a financial lender has
110 This is the basic factual foundation for Professor Countryman's complaint, see
Countryman, supra note 13, at 279, which is also cited in Schwartz, A Review, supra
note 2, at 5 n.13. Schwartz also cites J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND
POLICY 458-69, 476-77 (4th ed. 1977), to the effect that unsecured trade credit (which,
of course, is inventory financing) is the largest single source of short-term corporate
debt. See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 4 n.10. The existence of trade credit is,
of course, confirmed by my text above and my descriptions of accounts receivable fi-
nancing and factoring. See supra text following note 76. To state that trade credit is
typically unsecured is a faulty generalization. See supra text accompanying notes 50-
53.
1 The latter difficulty could not be avoided by an accounts financer refusing to
take as security accounts that arose from the encumbered inventory. Picking and choos-
ing among accounts presents practical difficulties as well as the danger of mistakes. In
some situations it would be impossible even with care to segregate the accounts arising
from encumbered inventory. For example, the encumbered inventory might have been
unassembled parts or findings to an assembled product that produced the receivable; or
worse, there might be numerous claims to the account as proceeds of a variety of inven-
tory claims to separate components of the assembled product.
112 See Kripke, Haydock, Hirsch & Moore, Inventory and Receivables Financing
Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act, 87 BANKING L.J. 579,
594-603 (1970). Presenting this material on the floor of the American Law Institute in
these terms, I was sustained by the Institute against an attempt to reverse the Report-
ers' draft, which refused to provide that the purchase money priority in inventory auto-
matically carried through to the resulting accounts. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PROCEEDINGS 1971, at 341-47 (1972).
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security in the inventory or receivables that originated with the sup-
plier. But in perhaps hundreds of cases that have not ended in insol-
vency, the supplier may for years have been receiving payments much
faster than the debtor would have been able to provide had there not
been a financial lender ready to supply secured credit. The problem is
not all or none; it is not a zero-sum game. Rather, debtors and their
suppliers are both advantaged by a system that permits the debtors'
typically insufficient capital to be supplemented by financial lending
practices based on security. How much of this practical situation would
rigorous logic have deduced, in the absence of any reference to the fac-
tual commercial context?
C. The Key Assumptions of the Schwartz and Jackson & Kronman
Articles
1. Testing Hypotheses
The two articles under discussion are notable for their use entirely
of examples with assumed facts made up to illustrate their theories and
for the absence of any attempt to determine whether these factual as-
sumptions are typical of real world events.
This technique may appear at first glance to be justified by a
statement of no less an authority than a Nobel Laureate in Economics,
Milton Friedman. In The Methodology of Positive Economics,13 Pro-
fessor Friedman considered the frequent criticism that economic hy-
potheses do not conform to reality because of unrealistic assumptions.
He answered,
[T]o suppose that hypotheses have not only "implications"
but also "assumptions" and that the conformity of these "as-
sumptions" to "reality" is a test of the validity of the hypoth-
esis different from or additional to the test by implica-
tions . . . is fundamentally wrong and productive of much
mischief.
• . . [T]he relevant question to ask about the "assump-
tions" of a theory is not whether they are descriptively "real-
istic," for they never are . . . . [The validity of a theory can
only be ascertained] by seeing whether the theory works,
which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate
11s M. FRIEDMAN, The Mithodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN PosI-
rIVE ECONOMIcS 3 (1953).
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predictions.114
Thus Friedman sanctions the use of unrealistic assumptions
designed to hold constant all except one of the factors that impinge on
any business problem for the sake of developing an abstract model. Al-
though the mathematical or logical validity of an abstract model may
not depend on empirical verification, if it is to be used for any applica-
tion or for policy guidance the model's soundness must be tested against
the real world by testing its predictions in factual investigation. There-
fore, the usefulness of those economic models in law is subject to com-
pliance with Professor Friedman's test: does the model produce real
results either in ordering the seeming diversity of past events or in cor-
rectly predicting future events?
Economic analysis may have something to contribute to commer-
cial law, but there is great danger in hypotheses neither premised on
nor tested by facts, even in situations where getting the facts may not be
easy. "1 5 Abstract mathematical models based on hypothetical illustra-
tions may be useful, but it is well to bear in mind the cautions urged by
the distinguished economist and mathematician Oskar Morgenstern:
[T]he question of the limits of mathematics in economics
must be approached 'cautiously. . . . The limitations arose
mostly because a faulty economic model was set up and ana-
114 Id. at 14-15.
Professor Lon Fuller calls for even more circumspection in the use of abstract
models:
The necessity to work with, and to think in terms of, simplified mod-
els is as much a necessity in the social sciences as it is in physics .... In
the social sciences the transition from abstract models'to the actualities of
social living is not so simple. Though it is probably safe to say that in the
social sciences the degree of abstraction exceeds by far anything normally
encountered in the physical sciences, the very bulk and complexity of this
abstraction makes it difficult to state plainly just what has been left out.
This has the unfortunate result that as the potential damage done by mis-
applications of theory increases, the likelihood that such misapplications
will occur also increases. Sometimes, accordingly, the only safe course is to
disregard theories derived from abstract models when one is confronted
with the problems of actual human existence.
Fuller, An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. Rv. 1604, 1604
(1966).
125 See Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 641, 642 (1980)
("Unless the empirical counterpart to a theoretical standard can be identified, advocacy
of the latter cannot lead to any change in or validation of existing law."); Scott, An-
swers Are More Needed than Perspectives, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 285, 286 (1983)
("[Y]ou do finally need some empirical results."); Tullock, Two Kinds of Legal Effi-
ciency, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 659, 668 (1980) ("[T]he statement is made that . . . this
particular rule is the most efficient. It may or may not be. The only way to tell is to
engage in careful research . . ").
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lyzed mathematically ....
• ..[T]he primary task is to discover the true nature of
the underlying economic phenomenon and to concentrate ef-
forts in that direction, instead of stopping short and branch-
ing out into the mathematical treatment of an ill-defined and
vaguely described situation.116
Professor Hansmann has phrased this warning more explicitly:
"Recent years have brought an increasing level of formal modeling in
the law-and-economics literature. . . .Increasing formalization, how-
ever, also brings with it the possibility that scholars will come increas-
ingly to be concerned with the characteristics of formal models rather
than with the characteristics of reality." ' Similarly, Professor McCall,
in his review of a seminal work on the economics of signaling, asserts,
Too much of modern economic theory resides in a realm
remote from economic reality. . . .[A] science is healthy
only if its theoretical constructs eventually illuminate empiri-
cal phenomena and subsequent theories are enriched by this
- empirical contact ...
A theory that refrains from empirical testing should ab-
stain from policy. . . .Certainly economic theorists recog-
nize that empirical testing is a necessary prelude to policy.
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to go directly from theory
to policy.118
16 Morgenstern, Limits to the Uses of Mathematics in Economics, in MATHE-
MATICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 13, 19 (J. Oharlesworth ed. 1963). Similarly, Oli-
ver Williamson, an established academic economist, has warned that "'[tihe task of
linking concepts with observations demands a great deal of detailed knowledge of the
realities of economic life.' . . . I merely add that the study of business history is also
useful grist for the law-and-economics mill." Williamson, Intellectual Foundations:
The Need for a Broader View, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 210, 211 (1983) (quoting T.
KOOPMANS, THREE ESSAYS ON THE STATE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 145 (1957)). See
also Tullock, supra note 115, at 666-68 (Posnerian economic analysis of law not sup-
ported by empirical research).
Lawyers in the field of law and economics offer similar cautions. See Hansmann,
The Current State of Law-and-Economics Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 217, 231-
32 (1983) (noting lack of empirical investigation in law and economics); Kitch, supra
note 20, at 186 (Our culture accords special weight to evidence purporting to be scien-
tific.); Summers, The Future of Economics in Legal Education: Limits and Con-
straints, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 337, 339, 346 (1983) (emphasizing need for empirical
verification).
117 Hansmann, supra note 116, at 229.
118 McCall, Book Review, 14 J. ECON. LITERATURE 465, 466 (1976) (reviewing
A. SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATION TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RE-
LATED SCREENING PROCESSES (1974)).
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The financing of our system of distribution is simply too important
to risk tinkering on the basis of untested formal economic models.
Professors Schwartz and Jackson & Kronman have thus far shown
commendable restraint in refusing to conclude that their adverse conjec-
tures were confirmed."' Until their predictions and premises prove
more accurate, this restraint must continue. °
Professor Schwartz appears to be most conscious of these admoni-
tions. He constantly tests his various hypotheses to determine whether
the world conforms to them, even rejecting some because they do not
correctly predict the facts as he sees them. I have already suggested that
his view of the facts is often incomplete, and, as I shall try to show in
the next section, he does not carry through his testing at the most sig-
nificant points of his article. Indeed, my strongest disagreement with
Schwartz's approach is that he seems to consider law-and-economics
research as consisting of rummaging through economic hypotheses for-
mulated in other contexts for other purposes, in the hope of finding a
fit for his current problem, instead of formulating his own hypotheses
by first looking at the facts and at history. As shown above, looking at
the facts is a necessity before any theories of law and economics can
have practical value.
2. Stratification Theory
Although it is discussed only in a single footnote by both
Schwartz... and Jackson & Kronman, 22 a key premise of their articles
is reliance on stratification theory, a concept originally propounded by
119 See, e.g., Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 33 ("It is not known with
assurance whether security is efficient . . . or inefficient .... [N]ormative reasons for
altering current law are also hard to find.").
120 As Professor Michelman has said,
If an elegant theory appears to explain, in the correlational sense, a
respectable amount of the variance in a set of observations, there will be
some tendency to picture the variance remaining unexplained by that the-
ory as unsystematic, random, impenetrable muck lacking signifi-
cance ....
Critics of law and economics (myself included) believe the opposite is
true: that is, that the marginally trading-off (some critics would call it the
"commodity") form of consciousness and behavior posited by law and eco-
nomics is only one side of the story of what people-us-are and can be
like; that the story has other sides, no less coherent or authentic to who-
ever is in a frame of mind to receive them ....
Michelman, Reflections on Professional Education, Legal Scholarship, and the Law-
and-Economics Movement, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 197, 201 (1983).
121 See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 9 n.26.
122 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1154 n.46.
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Professors Modigliani and Miller. 2 ' Modigliani and Miller argued
that altering a firm's capital structure will not increase its value. Strati-
fication or leveraging of a corporate capital structure is not more effi-
cient because the reduced cost of capital to investors who are given a
priority position increases the riskiness of the capital provided by
others, who will correspondingly demand a higher return for their capi-
tal."2 Schwartz and Jackson & Kronman extend this theory by treating
the giving of security as a case of stratification and, therefore, assume
that what the secured party gets in added safety, the unsecured credi-
tors correspondingly lose,125 with no net change in the total cost of
credit to the debtor.
Professor Schwartz's article begins by demonstrating that logically
firms should never issue secured debt because they do not save any cost
of capital while incurring the additional costs of documenting and mon-
itoring the security arrangement.12 6 Schwartz concludes, "[T]o genera-
lize, firms would never sell secured debt but would instead pay interest
rates that reflect their risk category .... Because short-term secured
debt is often seen, however, something must be going on that is not
accounted for in the above analysis .... ,,'27 Schwartz then begins to
rummage through various economic theories looking for an answer.
His method, however, is built on a weak reed. Not only does strat-
ification theory not reign undisputed in economic circles, 2 ' but also it
123 Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the The-
ory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
124 See id. at 288-91; see also R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE FINANCE 357-59 (2d ed. 1984) (In a perfect market, changing a firm's capital
structure does not alter its total value.).
121 See supra note 31.
126 See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 7-9.
127 Id. at 9.
128 See, e.g., Durand, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory
of Investment: Comment, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 639 (1959). Other articles qualify the
theorem. See, e.g., Baxter, Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital, 22 J. FIN.
395, 402 (1967) ("[W]hen the restrictive assumptions of Modigliani and Miller are
relaxed in accordance with existing institutions, the result is the traditional cost of capi-
tal curve, declining at low amounts of debt but rising where leverage becomes substan-
tial."). In Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Cove-
nants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979), the authors conclude,
Since observed debt covenants have real costs, there must be some benefit
in the firm's capital structure; otherwise, the bondholder-stockholder con-
flict can be costlessly eliminated by not issuing debt. Hence our evidence
indicates not only that there is an optimal form of the debt contract, but
an optimal amount of debt as well. The benefits from issuing risky debt
are not well understood ....
Id. at 154.
In contrast, Posner and Scott accept that Modigliani and Miller's theory has now
been conclusively proved, but only with an enormous assumption that the capital mar-
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fails Milton Friedman's test of accurate prediction for failing to predict
the almost universal presence of stratified capital structures among cor-
porations, and the wide use of security. Stratification theory overlooks
numerous practical considerations that lead real firms to prefer differ-
ent capital structures.1 29 There is a whole body of finance theory on
optimal capital structures and the appropriate leveraging of corpora-
tions.1 30 It is a failure to let the facts distract him from his preconcep-
tions that sends Professor Schwartz put on his fruitless quest through
abstractions of economics.
3. Monitoring
Both articles give extensive consideration to the concept of moni-
toring.131 Monitoring considerations assume that managers will misbe-
have, that is, divert and misappropriate as much of firm resources from
other owners and creditors as possible. The authors of the leading arti-
cle on monitoring draw mathematical charts and produce exact formu-
lae to determine just how much the owner-manager can divert and
therefore how much the other owners and creditors should spend on
monitoring costs to inhibit the diversion. The expenses of monitoring
are termed agency costs.
1 32
Following this lead, Jackson & Kronman assume that, once the
owner has acquired funds at a fixed interest charge, it will be to the
owner's advantage to increase the risks to which the funds are subject.
In effect, the owner saves interest expense if it can use funds borrowed
at low-risk interest rates for high-risk projects.133 They then build a
whole structure of speculation and purported demonstration on the as-
ket is perfectly competitive and free from distortions. See R. POSNER & K. SCOTT,
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 284 (1980) (citing
Stiglitz, On the Irrelevance of Corporate Financial Policy, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 851
(1974)); see also R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 124, at 355 (Because of market
imperfections, capital structure of firm does affect firm's value.).
129 Practical considerations that determine the relative attractiveness of different
corporate capital structures include tax effects from the deductibility of interest and
nondeductibility of dividends, the increased riskiness of more highly leveraged capital
structures, transactions costs, and the efficiency of allocating risks to those most willing
to bear them. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 124, at 390-95.
10 See, e.g., J. COHEN, E. ZINBARG, & A. ZEIKEL, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 398 (3d ed. 1973); H. GUTHMANN & H. DOUGALL, COR-
PORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 269-90 (4th ed. 1962).
..1 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1149-61; Schwartz, A Review,
supra note 2, at 9-14.
182 The term "agency costs" and an elaboration of the concept of monitoring the
performance of managers by stockholders and creditors of corporations are developed in
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
8 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1149-50.
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sumption that the risk of debtor misbehavior is greatly feared, and that
the attention that creditors give to monitoring and its costs is pervasive.
From this they deduce that security will be demanded and willingly
given chiefly as a trade-off to reduce monitoring costs, and thus to re-
duce the interest rates required. They even assume that some creditors
cheerfully acquiesce in the preferential giving of security to other credi-
tors because the total monitoring cost for all creditors is thereby re-
duced."" They are right that security is-among other things-a moni-
toring device, but they misapprehend how it serves this function.
The absence of any indication in concrete operating terms of the
meaning of monitoring is notable in this and other academic economic
discussions. One must ask initially how an unsecured creditor could
monitor beyond reading the debtor's financial statements and indepen-
dent audit reports, and beyond requiring restrictive covenants in the
loan documents. Does the unsecured creditor stand on the shipping
dock, checking what goes out, or at the billing machines, checking the
invoices? That kind of monitoring by unsecured creditors does not hap-
pen and would be no small task to achieve meaningfully." 5 Monitoring
134 See id. at 1150-58.
135 Cf Demsetz, The Monitoring of Management, in STATEMENT OF THE Busi-
NESS ROUND TABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCxTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS," at B-2 (1983) (exhibit B). Professor Demsetz writes of the difficulty of moni-
toring: "The Board's capability for monitoring management's planning . . .is more
limited than might be supposed. Board members generally have limited information
about the specific conditions and circumstances of the corporation." Id. The same is
true afortiori of unsecured creditors. Cf Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Com-
mercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 61-63 (1982) (discussing role of
outside directors as monitors on behalf of stockholders).
Although for over a decade "monitoring" had been the ruling theory of what a
corporate board of directors is supposed to do, the American Law Institute's project on
corporate governance met such strong criticism of the implications of the term that the
Institute had to abandon the term and substitute "oversee." See MacAvoy, Cantor,
Dana, & Peck, ALl Proposals for Increased Control of the Corporation by the Board
of Directors: An Economic Analysis, in STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUND TABLE
ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS," supra, at C-1
n.1 (exhibit C).
Similar recognition of the practical difficulties of monitoring is largely absent from
the academic law-and-economics writing discussed in this Article. See, e.g., Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 3, at 1149-61; Levmore, supra, at 68-75; Schwartz, A Review,
supra note 2, at 9-14; Scott, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Struc-
ture, 32 J. FIN. 1, 13-16 (1977); Smith & Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and
Optimal Capital Structure: Comment, 34 J. FIN. 247, 247-50 (1979); Scott, Bank-
ruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: Reply, 34 J. FIN. 252 (1979).
Levmore, for example, characterizes enforcement actions by secured creditors or by the
bondholders' trustee as monitoring devices that signal trouble to stockholders. See
Levmore, supra, at 68-70, 72-73. It is undoubtedly true that in all of these situations
common stockholders get a signal of trouble, but Levmore does not distinguish between
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by unsecured creditors scarcely exists outside of reviewing financial
statements and including restrictive covenants. Even these covenants are
of diminishing importance and frequently are not used in transactions
with small businesses.
Other monitoring occurs almost entirely in the case of secured
transactions because it is based on the property rights that security
gives.1 8' The secured creditor has sufficient rights in the collateral to
act promptly and curtail losses. The unsecured creditor lacks any com-
parable rights. Jackson & Kronman's trade-off between interest rates
and monitoring costs can hardly exist where there is no monitoring.
Nor can it exist in those large areas of open account trade credit where
no interest is charged. Thus, the Jackson & Kronman armchair voyage
of exploration of monitoring never reaches the real world.
It is strange that Jackson & Kronman defend security as a moni-
toring device but later puzzle over after-acquired property clauses and
speculate on the motives of the secured party in taking such rights.
13 7
Their elaborate economic explanation fails to note the simple manner
in which the after-acquired clause serves as a monitoring device: the
debtor must come to the secured party for permission to make new
secured borrowings from others (except as this power is limited by the
purchase money priority). Again, the effectiveness of monitoring is
based on a property right, and the device is inoperative only when the
new money is traced into new assets.
Professor Schwartz, in disputing that monitoring can explain the
existence of security, reasons that security should be unnecessary in
short-term lending because the shortness of time precludes the debtor
from despoiling the secured parties' rights. Schwartz realizes that se-
curity is nevertheless taken in some short-term debt situations such as
inventory and accounts receivable financing. He concludes that moni-
toring therefore cannot be the explanation. If he had considered the
real-world risk of these short-term loans, however, as discussed
above, 38 he would have understood that monitoring based on property
financial trouble innocently experienced and the kind of "misbehavior" on which theo-
ries of credit monitoring are based. Nor, unfortunately, does Levmore explain how
signals from senior claimants that the barn door is open will be useful to the common
stockholders after the horse is stolen. Only Smith and Warner come close to a realistic
discussion of the role of security in monitoring. See Smith & Warner, supra, at 250.
136 See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (" 'Security interest' means an interest in personal
property .... "); cf. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75 (1982) (A
security interest is a property interest with greater protection from a retroactive taking
than the mere contractual right to payment of the debt secured.).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 100-01. Compare Jackson & Kronman,
supra note 3, at 1149-61 with id. at 1166-75.
18 See supra text accompanying notes 68-79.
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rights is especially necessary in short-term loans of the kind typically
made with security.
4. Signaling
Professor Schwartz also considers secured debt as a signal.1"' He
looks to the new economic doctrine of signaling and to applications of it
in the financial field, speculating that "[a] firm willing to encumber its
assets is, thus, 'signaling' that, in its view, its prospects justify these
potential costs."'14 The costs involve giving secured creditors greater
leverage over the firm's behavior and making it more difficult to
reschedule debts in the event of hard times. Schwartz goes on to state
that
[t]he apparent property of secured debt to communicate ac-
curately to creditors a firm's true estimate of its expected
earnings indicates that the existence of secured debt may be
explained as a signaling phenomenon. The information con-
veyed by the issuance of secured debt enables firms to bor-
row on terms that more accurately reflect their risk.141
He concludes that "[t]his signaling explanation is promising but, unfor-
tunately, has serious difficulties. A security-interest signal may be
ambiguous ... 142
I have elsewhere expressed my view that the concept of signaling,
even if it may be a promising new tool of economic analysis in other
contexts, has not been brought over successfully to financial markets. 43
The effort to apply it here strengthens my view.
If Professor Schwartz had ventured into the factual world by even
casual inquiry to formulate a hypothesis instead of trying to adapt a
theory formulated in different factual contexts, he would have learned
that incurring secured debt does indeed "signal" a firm's risk class, but
the information conveyed is the exact opposite of what he conjectures.
He would have been told in no uncertain terms that firms that can
avoid giving secured debt do so. There is no signaling to demonstrate
ability to survive the restrictions of security. On the contrary, the grant-
"' See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 14-21.
140 Id. at 15.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 17.
141 See Kripke, Commentary, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULAION 203 (F. Ed-
wards ed. 1979) (discussing Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Impli-
cations of Modern Finance Theory and Signalling Theory, in id. at 177, and Ross,
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8
BELL J. ECON. 23 (1977)).
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ing of security is an involuntary signal of the opposite kind, namely
that the debtor cannot borrow unsecured because creditors think the
risk is too great. It is the termination of the necessity to borrow on a
secured basis that demonstrates and may signal strength, not the entry
into such an arrangement. If Professor Schwartz had been attentive to
markets and their history, he would have noted that for a long period
there was active opposition to a requirement of public notice of security
in accounts receivable financing, exactly because secured borrowing on
accounts was deemed to be a signal of weakness, not strength.144 The
words of success used to be, "He's out of the finance companies [i.e.,
secured loans] and into the banks [i.e., unsecured loans]. '145
I have not exhausted the list of hypotheses discussed by Professor
Schwartz as possible explanations for the existence of security. For ex-
ample, Professor Schwartz devotes several pages to the possibility that
the explanation of security is that it increases welfare by reducing un-
certainty on the part of creditors. 1 4 He treats "uncertainty" as an eco-
nomic concept floating in a sea of abstraction. But in this context the
only relevance of the term would have been "uncertainty of payment of
the debt." Its converse would be "certainty of payment of the debt." As
we have seen, in some situations this comes best from a security
interest.
Elsewhere in his article Professor Schwartz asserts, "When a cred-
itor becomes secured, . . . certain . . . assets of the debtor are set
aside to help insure that this creditor is paid; in consequence, its chance.
of collecting its debt are [sic] much increased. . . . [T]he chance that
the debtor's unsecured creditors will collect their debts correspondingly
14 See, e.g., N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, COMMUNICATION AND STUDY RE-
LATING TO ASSIGNMENT OF AccoUNTs RECEIVABLE (N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(k)
(1946)); Koessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 57-60
(1945). The commentary to section 9-302 of the UCC states that under prior accounts
receivable statutes the jurisdictions were split on whether to require public notice of
accounts receivable financing by filing. See U.C.C. § 9-302 comment 5.
The late Soia Mentschikoff, Associate Reporter for the UCC, commented that
at one time there was the business of screaming that if you had to file on
an assignment of accounts, the world would end. In any event, the assign-
ment of accounts receivable business would disappear. Accounts receivable
would no longer be appropriate subject matter for a secured loan ....
But none of these things happened.
Mentschikoff, Uniform Commercial Code-20 Years After, in N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N,
ADDRESSES AT ANNUAL MEETING OF BANKING, CORPORATION AND BusINEss SEC-
TION 37, 45 (Jan. 27, 1972).
" This remark would no longer be appropriate because banks have now moved
into asset-based secured lending themselves. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying
text.
146 See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 24-27.
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decreases.1u 7 But his conclusion belies this premise: "[T]he existence of
secured debt seems not to increase uncertainty for a firm's other
creditors . "... ,148
Yet his conclusion is right-it is his premise that is wrong. As we
have seen in Part I,1"9 secured credit that makes possible the purchase
of additional assets takes nothing from unsecured creditors, and may
benefit all parties.
I believe I have sufficiently indicated the flavor of Professor
Schwartz's article. I have not thought it worthwhile to meet him four-
square on the substance of other discussions, all of which end inconclu-
sively or with rejection of the application of the economic theory dis-
cussed. I simply cannot believe that the study of abstract concepts
developed in other contexts for other purposes can in any way contrib-"
ute to an understanding of practical commercial law or policy.
D. Disregard of the Judgment of the Market
Writers in law and economics frequently espouse the laissez-faire
theme that government should not interfere with the market unless it is
clear that there exists a market failure, such as a monopoly or oligop-
oly, that prevents free market competition from determining prices,
supply, or demand. 150 If this test were applied to the market for chattel
security in commercial lending, one would have to conclude that the
market has no apparent competitive failures. It is not dominated by any
one lender, by an oligopoly of lenders, or by any particular type of
lender. There are numerous commercial banks, retail banks, finance
companies, and factors.151 There are also insurance companies, pension
funds, savings and loan associations, and credit unions, as well as other
more specialized lenders. Each competes with the others and the pres-
ent trend is toward increased competition by expanding the power of
these various lenders to make different types of loans in diverse areas of
commerce.1 52 The credit market is a textbook case of strong market
147 Id. at 7.
148 Id. at 24.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 57-95.
150 See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 20, at 191-92.
151 The National Commercial Finance Association has 200 members, including
banks and bank affiliates. There are, of course, thousands of banks, large and small.
152 At each session of Congress bills are introduced to relax restrictions on banks
and savings and loans associations. See, e.g., S. 879, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (bill
to authorize depository institutions to engage in securities activities); S. 2107, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (bill to provide geographic deregulation of banking). Many
restrictions were relaxed in the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.
See Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 11 & 12
U.S.C.).
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competition.
The market for secured credit is also a market of strong competi-
tion. Yet borrowers have always recognized that giving security is
somewhat restrictive and undesirable.15 If most lenders in a particular
class of transactions did not agree about the necessity for security, other
lenders willing to make loans on an unsecured basis would drive the
secured lenders out of the market, but this has not occurred. Nor is
there any clamor from groups representing borrowers, or from credit
associations and other groups representing unsecured lenders, for
change in the state laws that permit secured credit, or change in the
Bankruptcy Code, which recognizes the rights of secured creditors.
Those who question the fairness or the economic efficiency of se-
curity arrangements ought to carry the burden of showing why the
judgment of the market is not to be accepted.1 54 Professor Schwartz's
thesis that higher interest rates should be a suitable substitute for secur-
ity is unsupported by any general movement of the competitive market
away from secured financing arrangements.
When the market no longer finds security necessary and can ac-
cept the proposition that an increased interest rate is an adequate sub-
stitute, the market may abandon security. This abandonment has al-
ready happened in certain areas of financing that involve numerous
small loans and where the available collateral has slight value. For
many years, major household appliances were sold subject to security in
the goods and with installment payments. In the last two decades, many
stores began to sell these goods on revolving credit plans without secur-
ity. Revolving credit plans typically require payment of at least ten per-
cent of the principal per month rather than the substantially lesser per-
centages that were required under eighteen to thirty-six month
installment plans. The effective interest rate may also be higher than
under the security arrangement.1 55 The same result occurs when goods
153 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
'" One may argue that the government has already intervened in the marketplace
for credit by establishing the rights of secured creditors under the UCC. The UCC,
however, merely codifies and simplifies prior commercial practice-it does not alter the
nature of credit transactions. Cf Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d
324, 330 (9th Cir. 1973) (the right of peaceful repossession under the California Com-
mercial Code codified existing law and practice), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
Moreover, even if secured credit was legally unenforceable, the market would find al-
ternative ways to achieve the same result. See infra text accompanying notes 167-74. In
any event, governmental intervention through the UCC and the Bankruptcy Code does
not defeat the market's ability to choose between secured credit and other credit
arrangements.
"5 But the rates may coincide because both are at or close to the statutory maxi-
mum. Compare UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.201(2), 7 U.L.A. 651 (master ed.
1978) (maximum rate provisions on sales not pursuant to open-end credit) with id. §
[Vol. 133:929
ECONOMICS AND COMMERCIAL LAW
formerly bought on secured credit are bought with merchant or bank
credit cards. Some stores offer the consumer a choice between these
types of financing. In this area of consumer credit, where the collateral
value is slight, practice confirms Schwartz's thesis that increased inter-
est rates and accelerated payments can be a substitute for security.
156
Similar change is noticeably absent, however, in other areas of secured
financing.
When the individual exposure is large and the collateral of sub-
stantial value, all types of lenders seem increasingly to be moving to-
ward secured loans. Neither Schwartz nor Jackson & Kronman have
observed the strongest example of this trend: the changing role of banks
from being primarily unsecured lenders to becoming secured lenders
engaged in asset-based financing, in much the same circumstances as
the finance companies and for the same reasons.1 57
2.202(3), 7 U.L.A. 659 (maximum rates on open-end credit).
1I Similar market influences apply in the small-loan business. The amounts in-
volved are typically kept small by statute because of the high interest rates permitted.
See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.401(2), 7 U.L.A. 671 (master ed. 1978);
J. SPANOGLE & R. ROHNER, CONSUMER LAW 481 (1979). The kinds of collateral
possessed by borrowers who need to pay these high interest rates usually have little
resale value, and the loans are generally unsecured. In addition, enforcement remedies
in non-purchase-money cases on household goods are generally restricted. See, e.g.,
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 5.112, 5.116, 7 U.L.A. 773, 775-76 (master ed.
1978).
157 One indication of this trend is the recent creation by the American Bar Associ-
ation's Section on Corporation, Banking, and Business Law of a committee to specialize
in the law of asset-based financing. It is also notable that while in its early days the
National Commercial Finance Conference (NCFC) did not admit bank-affiliated lend-
ers to membership; in 1982, 65% of the members were bank affiliates, including many
of the largest banks in the United States.
Stephen C. Diamond, a Senior Vice President of the First National Bank of Chi-
cago, states that asset-based financing by banks, as with finance companies, "still in-
volves the extension of credit, based on a relatively high weighting of collateral and a
relatively low weighting of the borrower's financial strength." Asset-Based Lending, 39
NCFC J., Apr. 30, 1983, at 22, 22 (statement by S. Diamond). Robert Martinsen,
Chairman of Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc., discusses the movement of banks into
asset-based lending as the result of market pressures:
What's happened in the past 15 years? The equity markets have dissolved.
Long-term debt sources have dried up. ...
Our industry will continue to grow as the use of secured lending
surges. Healthier companies will have difficulty meeting the credit criteria
required for unsecured borrowers. . ..
The middle market has always been perilous for the banker, who has
consistently financed it with insufficient security and inadequate monitor-
ing. As the shake-out from the current recession occurs, more and more
lenders will realize that the way to finance the middle market is through
the asset-based lending product.
Id. at 30-31 (statement by R. Martinsen).
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Banks found a large need foi" financing among small and moder-
ate-sized corporate borrowers. These borrowers, unlike giant corpora-
tions, were unable to borrow unsecured at or close to the prime rate.
The banks appear to have decided that this market could not be served
merely by charging a higher interest rate but must be served through
the safety of a security interest. 58 When the banks first learned this
lesson, they entered the field by participating in secured finance com-
pany loans. They then began, either directly or through their holding
companies, to buy finance companies-not to obtain capital, but to ob-
tain their expertise. Banks could not operate in this tricky field with
traditional bank lending officers skilled only at studying financial state-
ments. In asset-based financing, lending officers had to understand the
worth of the collateral in supporting credit and the practical operating
risks and protective methods of the business. Banks, therefore, had to
buy the finance companies to get trained personnel.' 59 As a result, the
independent commercial finance companies of thirty years ago are to-
day often subsidiaries or departments of banks.
There is evidence that other countries are experiencing a move-
ment similar to our own in validating chattel security. Several Cana-
dian provinces have copied or adapted article 9.16 An international or-
58 The banks have learned that lowering the standards for unsecured loans cre-
ates increased percentages of credit losses; that is, it creates problems not fully compen-
sated by higher rates. Thus, banks are turning for the first time to secured loans. As
one commentator has noted:
[Hjeightened competition among banks . . . has resulted in much price-
cutting on credit terms. That squeezes banks' spreads between their inter-
est costs and interest income.
Thus, they have had to look elsewhere for new business sources, and
many are pleased with what they have found. For Citicorp, for instance,
asset-based lending is the fastest-growing and most profitable U.S. credit
business.
Helyar, Big Banks Seek New Business Sources and Draw Bead on Smaller Customers,
Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1983, at 8, col 1.
159 See Reisman, What the Commercial Lawyer Should Know About Commercial
Finance and Factoring, 79 COM. L.J. 146, 147 (1974). In 1983, Manufacturers Han-
over Corp. bought C.I.T. Financial Corp., which, until its acquisition a few years ear-
lier by R.C.A., had been the largest independent financing and factoring group. Fuji
Bank of Japan outbid a large bank holding company, Security Pacific Corp., for the
finance subsidiaries of Walter E. Heller International Corp. These are the latest in a
long series of transactions extending over at least 25 years by which banks acquired
finance companies. Security Pacific Corp. is now negotiating to purchase Commercial
Credit Corp., formerly the second largest independent financing and factoring group,
from Control Data Corp. See Wall St. J., May 2, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
160 See Ontario Personal Property Security Act, Ont. Stat. ch. 73 (1967), amended
by ch. 102 (1973), ch. 39 (1976), ch. 23 (1977); Manitoba Personal Property Security
Act, Man. Stat. ch. 5 (1973), amended by ch. 28, §§ 1-13, and ch. 61, § 10 (1977), ch.
21 (1978), ch. 32 (1979); Saskatchewan Personal Property Security Act, Sask. Stat. ch.
P-6.1 (1979-80). These statutes follow generally the CANADIAN MODEL UNIFORM
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ganization, UNIDROIT, is engaged in drafting a set of rules for
international leasing transactions that, in their present form, can also
be used for the type of security interest we used to call a "conditional
sales contract."' 61
Although Judge Posner has concluded that in many situations the
common law leads to economically efficient rules, 6 ' Schwartz and
Jackson & Kronman have great difficulty in reaching that conclusion
about the legal rules that permit secured credit. A look at the increased
use of secured credit in commercial practices, instead of highly abstract
reasoning, would have provided a useful perspective and a less uncer-
tain conclusion.
E. Failure to Consider the Feasibility of Abolishing Secured Credit
In questioning bankruptcy priorities as to secured credit, Professor
Schwartz quite clearly questions the justification for secured credit alto-
gether, with the implicit hypothesis that perhaps it ought to be limited
or abolished. 63 Yet there is little chance that secured credit could be
restricted or abolished without immediate evasion. It should be appar-
ent to anyone with a practical orientation that other closely related de-
vices are available to accomplish the same result.
First of all, as Jackson & Kronman acknowledge,"" and as exper-
ienced people in this field know, the UCC merely codifies and simpli-
fies prior commercial practice. There is nothing that the UCC permits
that could not be done without it."65 The UCC reduced the interest cost
of inventory and accounts receivable financing, to the benefit of debtors
and unsecured creditors, in two ways. First, it eliminated many legal
risks and uncertainties and made filing easier, thus reducing creditors'
operating costs.1"6 Second, the reduction of uncertainty also encouraged
the banks to begin asset-based financing, furnishing competition to the
finance companies and reducing rates because of banks' lower cost of
money.1 67 Restricting the rights and priorities afforded secured credi-
PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACr (1970).
1"1 See Coogan, Is There a Difference Between a Long-Term Lease and an In-
stallment Sale of Personal Property?, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1036, 1037-41 (1981).
16 See R. POSNER, supra note 39, passim; Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of
Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 281, 288-91 (1979).
161 See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 1-7.
1 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1157.
165 See Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1333, 1334-37
(1963).
166 For example, the UCC eliminated the requirement of Benedict v. Ratner, 268
U.S. 353 (1925), that the lender exert "dominion" over the proceeds of these kinds of
collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-205 & comment.
167 Before the UCC and during my period of active involvement in the business,
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tors under the UCC would increase the cost of secured financing, but
would not eliminate it.
There is, however, a more fundamental obstacle to any effort to
restrict the giving of security in receivables. Receivables are obligations
owed the manufacturer or merchant for the sale of goods for which the
processes of the seller have been completed. Receivables can be collected
approximately as well by selling them as by borrowing against them or
by holding them until maturity. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) recognizes that
sales and loans secured by receivables are nearly identical in economic
effect and treats them all as secured transactions. Wisely, the UCC
does not attempt to control the holder's decision of which alternative to
follow for "cashing" receivables."6 8
The law could hardly prohibit a businesswoman who needed cash
from selling her receivables any more than it could refuse to allow her
to sell tangible assets. It is hard to see how the law could prohibit even
a sale of receivables with recourse. In the case of chattel paper, there is
substantial authority to the effect that a sale with recourse is neverthe-
less a true sale for various purposes.169 The fundamental question in
negotiating the "cashing" of receivables is who bears the credit losses,
and this can be accommodated in several ways, such as by adjusting the
price of the transfer.
Consider, for example, three different ways that a department
store offering charge accounts can obtain relief from the working capi-
tal pressures that result from its extension of credit to customers. As-
sume that credit losses average one percent of the total credit extended
and that the average account is paid off in two months.
the prime bank rate was in the neighborhood of six percent, and the typical secured
commercial finance rate was double the prime rate.,Since banks have entered the fi-
nance picture this spread has been reduced. The assertions in the text are generally
supported by the panel discussion in Asset-Based Lending, supra note 157, at 22-35.
Of particular interest are the remarks of Mr. Lowell L. Byron of McKinsey & Co.,
Inc., id. at 23-24, Mr. John F. Nickoll of the Foothill Group, Inc., id. at 26, and Mr.
Robert Martinsen of Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc., id. at 30-32.
'" Accountants draw distinctions that the UCC draws only partially between a
sale of receivables with recourse and a secured loan. See U.C.C. §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(2)
(distinguishing between sales and loans only for purposes of deficiency judgments and
treatment of surplus proceeds). Cf. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD,
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 77, REPORTING BY
TRANSFERORS FOR TRANSFERS OF RECEIVABLES wrrH RECOURSE, app. C, 119 (Dec.
1983) ("Although transfers of receivables with recourse may have many of the same
characteristics that collateralized loans have, the Board concluded that a substantive
distinction can and should be made between transactions accounted for as sales of re-
ceivables with recourse and loans collateralized by receivables.").
"I See Kripke, Conceptual Obsolescence in Law and Accounting-Finance Re-
lations Between Retailer and Assignee of Retail Receivables, 1 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REV. 55, 56, 60-61 (1959).
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First, the store can borrow up to one hundred percent of the face
amount of its accounts from a bank, pay twelve percent interest, and
grant a security interest in the accounts. Over an average two-month
maturity, the bank will earn two percent on each account. With this
procedure the bank does not suffer any credit losses on the accounts.
Second, the store can sell the accounts to the bank for ninety-eight per-
cent of their face amount, with recourse-that is, the store agrees to
cover any credit losses. The bank will collect one hundred percent of
the face amount, thus earning the same two percent per account. Third,
the store can sell the accounts to the bank for ninety-seven percent of
the face amount, without recourse. The bank will absorb the one per-
cent default rate and collect ninety-nine percent of the face amount,
again earning a two percent return. There is no real economic differ-
ence among these three transactions.1 "
There is, finally, a fourth way in which a corporate seller of goods
can finance its receivables. It can segregate them in a wholly owned
finance company subsidiary, and then have the subsidiary borrow to
obtain the funds with which to extend the credit represented by the
receivables. The borrowing need not be on a secured basis because the
segregation of the receivables in the subsidiary gives to the lenders of
the subsidiary claims to the assets ahead of the claims of the parent
company's creditors, and thus presents almost the exact equivalent of
borrowing by the parent company on the security of the receivables.
171
Similar difficulties would arise in any attempt to inhibit businesses
from acquiring tangible assets, such as inventory or equipment, on se-
cured credit. Much of this credit is purchase money financing. The per-
son who supplies the goods on credit, or who supplies the financial
credit with which the goods Are purchased, could instead keep or take
ownership of the property, making it available to the user by various
170 A similar example could be devised using dealer sales of chattel paper. Cf
Kripke, Book Review, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1220, 1224-25 (1971) (reviewing AMERICAN
BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES (1971)) (demonstrating difficulty
of distinguishing sales from loans on factual characteristics of transaction). Even when
business realities may lead to identical accounting classifications, there is still the possi-
bility that differences in form may have important consequences in other areas such as
taxation and the application of indenture restrictions. See Kripke, supra note 169;
Simpson, Loan Partidpations: Piffallsfor Participants, 31 Bus. LAW. 1977, 1978-79
(1976).
117 It is well known that the automobile manufacturers have finance company
subsidiaries for this purpose. It is perhaps not equally well known that companies like
Sears and Montgomery Ward have similar subsidiaries to finance open account receiv-
ables. Obviously, any attempt to outlaw secured borrowing on receivables would simply
lead to further development of this practice. See Kripke, Captive Finance Companies:
Legal Aspects, in AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, supra note 55, at 13; Wal-
len, supra note 55, at 30.
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relationships other than as secured creditor and borrower. In particu-
lar, equipment may be leased, 17 ' and inventory delivered on consign-
ment.17s Finally, if any attempt were made to change the present rules
I2 UCC article 9 still recognizes a distinction between true leases and leases in
which the lessee has the option to acquire ownership for a nominal amount beyond the
lease rentals. The UCC categorizes the latter type as "leases intended as security" and
treats them as security interests. U.C.C. § 1-201(37). Presumably any rules abolishing
or restricting secured credit or changing its priority would apply to such leases. Yet it
seems likely that owners of goods who have been unwilling to entrust them to users
without security might get an approximate equivalent by refusing to sell and instead
leasing them under "true leases." There would be some greater economic risk for the
lessor, but it might still be better than a credit sale without retained security. On the
elusive distinction between the true lease and the security lease, see B. FRITCH & A.
REISMAN, EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING (2d ed. 1980); Kripke, Book
Review, 37 Bus. LAW. 723 (1982) (reviewing B. FRrrTCH & A. REISMAN, supra);
Boss, Lease Chattel Paper: Unitary Treatment of a "Special" Kind of Commercial
Specialty, 1983 DUKE L.J. 69; Coogan, supra note 161.
As Professor Kronman has noted, "Any incomplete regulation of a contractual
relationship, that is, any regulation which stops short of imposing a compulsory con-
tract on the parties, is unlikely to achieve its redistributive purpose. . . . [T]he parties
to a contract remain free to modify their arrangements in ways not already subject to
governmental control . . . ." Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89
YALE L.J. 472, 506 (1980).
173 For inventory, the UCO still recognizes the consignment as different from the
secured transaction, and all that is necessary to protect the consignment against invali-
dation under state law and federal bankruptcy law is to make a simple filing that is the
equivalent of other Code filings. See U.C.C. §§ 2-326(3), 9-114, 9-408. It would b€
possible to use the consignment to avoid prohibitions on security interests, but some
significant adjustments in financial affairs would be necessary. Manufacturers who fur-
nished goods to dealers on consignment would not have accounts receivable against
which to borrow, and could not recognize profit until the dealers became firmly com-
mitted to pay by reason of having sold the consigned goods.
To avoid the recognition of debt, secured or unsecured, on a corporate balance
sheet, a variety of devices have been worked out by which a supplier of funds keeps
control of fixed assets or goods while the user or "sponsor" pays for them. In a "prod-
uct financing arrangement" the sponsor owns the goods, sells them to another, and
agrees to repurchase them; or the sponsor may arrange for another party to purchase
the goods from a source and agree to purchase them from the other party. The Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board has recently taken the position that the sponsor should
show the asset on its balance sheet and recognize the obligation to purchase as a debt. If
the other party has possession of the asset, the transaction resembles a pledge. See FI-
NANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT-
ING STANDARDS No. 49, ACCOUNTING FOR PRODUCr FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS
(june 1981). The accounting determination is not necessarily conclusive for legal pur-
poses, however, and lawyers' ingenuity might find a way to use these devices to avoid a
prohibition on secured debt.
Somewhat similar relationships are not classified as debt. Arrangements known as
"take-or-pay contracts" and "throughput contracts" have a similar purpose to avoid
recognition of debt. In these situations the Financial Accounting Standards Board re-
quires only disclosure, not recognition of the asset and liability. See FINANCIAL AC-
COUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS No. 47, DISCLOSURE OF LONG-TERM OBLIGATIONS (Mar. 1981). This is
because accounting has never required the recognition of an asset and liability in the
case of long-term forward purchase contracts.
Thus, these devices provide the same preferential claim to inventory and other
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by discriminating in favor of trade credit, as Professor Schwartz seems
to prefer, similar problems would arise in differentiating trade credit
from financial credit.
17 4
III. AGENDA FOR RESEARCH ON ARTICLE 9
While the Schwartz and Jackson & Kronman articles do not seem
to me to have advanced the cause of improving commercial law to any
significant extent, I do think that there remains room for factual re-
search on specific questions. This section offers concrete examples of
questions open to research.
A. Confirmation of the Importance of Chattel Security to Our
Distribution System
I have asserted throughout this Article that most small business is
undercapitalized and needs the working capital that is supplied by in-
ventory and receivables lending from financial lenders. If these asser-
tions need verification, they may readily be checked through banks and
credit organizations.
I have suggested that cases in which the supplier finds itself un-
secured while financial creditors hold as security the inventory that it
supplied17 5 are few compared to instances of the successful use of se-
cured credit. If suppliers customarily took purchase money security in-
terests in inventory and if the priority of the security interest carried
through to the resulting receivables, then financial lenders could not
extend credit on inventory and receivables. Therefore, I believe that, on
balance, suppliers have benefitted from the willingness of secured fi-
nancial lenders to step into the picture and limit the amount of credit
that suppliers need extend. The occasional losses suffered by suppliers
as a result of the bankruptcy of their debtors should be balanced
against the many cases where there is no bankruptcy and where suppli-
ers have been paid over the course of long and successful credit
relationships.
Even as to this there are differences of opinion. Professor Fairfax
Leary, Jr., has told me that in areas of Philadelphia there is little sup-
plier credit because too much lending is preempted by broad financing
assets used in the enterprise that the wholly owned finance subsidiary provides in the
case of receivables: that is, they provide the functional equivalent of secured debt while
escaping that classification.
114 See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
175 This is the predicament of which Professor Countryman complains. See Coun-
tryman, supra note 13, at 269.
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statements of secured creditors.1"6 Researchers could usefully try to de-
termine how suppliers generally adapt to the existence of broad inven-
tory and receivables security interests. Do they put the debtor on a
C.O.D. basis, as Professor Leary seems to suggest?' 7" Does the secured
party formally or informally guarantee the supplier credits, or use field
audits to make sure that debt to suppliers is not accumulating?
It would not be too difficult a research project to learn what actu-
ally happens in those cases where broad financing statements cover in-
ventory and receivables. A survey of moderate-sized bankrupt compa-
nies that have had such relationships with financial lenders could be
made either by examining court records or by consulting with bank-
ruptcy judges and commercial lawyers. Some judgment might be
reached on a firmer factual basis than is presently available as to
whether, on the whole, trade suppliers have benefitted from long-term
relationships in which they were promptly paid, or whether they have
lost because inventory that they furnished in short-term relationships
with failing debtors was subject to the security interests of secured
lenders.
Research through bankruptcy specialists would, however, present
only one side. It would not show the results of the many cases of se-
cured lending that either continue for many years satisfactorily for all
concerned, or that reach the point where the debtor graduates to un-
secured borrowing. One potential source of information on these cases
is surveys of commercial lawyers or their commercial lender clients.
Another is the files of the National Commercial Finance Association,
which for many years has given annual awards to companies that
started with commercial financing and graduated into unsecured bor-
rowing or public financing.
Although a claim of logical "rigor" could not be made for the pro-
posed empirical study, it would be based on the same kind of inquiry
that legislators and businessmen regularly use in their determinations
of policy. Such an empirical study might give a more balanced view of
this problem than abstract economic hypothesizing can provide.
B. The Unsecured Character of Factoring
Another focus of inquiry might be why the receivables involved in
factoring are unsecured, and why the factor, unlike most commercial
financers, has only "one name paper"-that is, a trade obligation of the
account debtor without recourse against its assignor except for breach
176 Conversation between Fairfax Leary, Jr. and Homer Kripke (1983).
177 Id.
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of warranty and without security.
One answer lies in the circumstances of factoring. This form of
financing appears at every level of the production process. No doubt
part of the answer is historical. Factoring began early in the nineteenth
century. For many years, there were no statutes facilitating the taking
of security in receivables."7 8 A more practical reason why the factor can
afford to succeed to the seller's risk on an unsecured basis is that the
factor is highly selective in taking risks, and will reject those that seem
undesirable on an unsecured basis.' The factor can do this because it
deals with a seller that frequently sells to the same customer in a chain
of manufacture and distribution. Enough business is provided by each
account debtor so that the factor can and does maintain elaborate credit
files on each one and can exert sufficient effort to determine whether
unsecured risks are reasonably safe.' 80 These transactions generally in-
volve more credit-worthy debtors than those involved in commercial re-
ceivable lending with recourse, and factoring relationships tend to be
more continuous. Finally, another explanation is that the factor may
hold back from the face of the account not only an amount to pay for
the use of its money but also a discount to cover the expected credit
losses. Yet the contrast with the general secured position of commercial
financing is strong, and the explanations are not wholly satisfying. Per-
haps research would disclose other explanations.
C. Other Anomalies in Secured Credit
Another subject for study might be why security formerly taken is
no longer taken in some situations but is still taken in other comparable
situations. For example, industrial secured borrowing through public
bond issues, reasonably common before World War II, has almost van-
ished."8 Why has this happened? Professor Schwartz offers the sugges-
17' For a brief history of the commercial factor, see Steffen & Danziger, The Re-
birth of the Commercial Factor, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 745 (1936).
179 In rare instances, the mill insists on selling to the customer and, in order to
induce the factor to buy the account, assigns the account with recourse. If the factor lets
this happen too often, it may find itself holding obligations of uncollectible account
debtors and having recourse against an assignor who has made itself insolvent by im-
provident risk-taking.
180 By contrast, in "retail factoring" it is not clear that factors can maintain ade-
quate credit files on all retailers who may be customers of this distribution process.
Retailers range from top credit risks like Macy's and Neiman Marcus to small dress
shops with high mortality rates. Afortiori, factoring does not deal with sales to retail
users because there are so many of them that the problems of checking credit make the
techniques of factoring wholly inappropriate.
181 Cf McDaniel, supra note 86, at 880 (suggesting that even negative pledge
clauses as a substitute for security are obsolete).
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tion that creditors do not take security in firms likely to be reorganized
rather than liquidated, presumably because reorganization does not
permit resort to the collateral."8 2 Professor Schwartz's reasoning would
be consistent with the fact that private industrial borrowings from insti-
tutional lenders are still frequently secured by real estate mortgages
and the like; the absence of public bondholders' interests makes it less
likely that resort to reorganization would be attempted, or at any rate
that it would succeed. But his explanation is unsatisfying because even
if the secured creditor cannot carry away its collateral in the case of a
,big industrial reorganization, the collateral does give it priority in the
distribution of the reorganization securities. Moreover, that explanation
would not, in any event, explain why railroad public debt issues and
public utility public debt issues are still secured, even though those
companies are more likely to be reorganized than liquidated.
Disputes over the desirability of recent rapid expansions of secured
credit seem to focus on the sweep of the after-acquired property clause
and of notice filing.183 There may be room for considering a limitation
on the availability of such credit in the case of financing for users,
where there is no continuing commitment or arrangement for new
loans against newly-acquired property. Such a limitation would present
a drafting problem for accessions and replacements. But even assuming
that the drafting problem could be solved, it is by no means clear that
change is called for. In inventory and receivables situations, where con-
tinuing loans are normally assumed, change in this respect would
greatly disrupt our present system and would be undesirable unless the
empirical investigations proposed above showed abuses in the present
system.
As a final example, there has recently been a spate of criticism
concerning potential abuses in leveraged buyouts. A leveraged buyout is
a financial transaction in which members of management or outside
entrepreneurs take a company private-that is, buy out the public
stockholders of a company with funds obtained from borrowings se-
cured by the company's assets. Several years ago, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) expressed concern about the need for full
disclosure of the fairness of the transaction in relation to the advantages
obtained by management against the public stockholders. 1 More re-
cently, in an SEC memorandum, I raised the question of the possible
illegality of this substitution of secured borrowing for equity, in relation
182 See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 25-26.
a See supra note 13.
18 See In re Spartek Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
81,961 (Feb. 14, 1979).
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to unsecured creditors.1 8 5 This concern was later independently echoed
by SEC Chairman Shad in terms of the danger of bankruptcy because
of excessive leverage." 6 Thus these potentials for abuse of secured
credit are being handled through the securities laws and the law of
fraudulent conveyance. They need not affect the propriety of secured
credit in other applications.
There are no doubt other problems concerning the appropriate
scope and governing rules of secured credit in the chattel field that
would warrant further research. I believe that research can best be car-
ried out by factual inquiry among those practicing in the field. If the
Schwartz and Jackson & Kronman articles are typical, economic analy-
sis without factual investigation does not have much to offer in as
highly practical a field as commercial law.
CONCLUSION
It may be presumptuous to draw conclusions from intensive study
of only two articles. In any event, it seems to me that articles like these
cannot be meaningful or persuasive to conventional academics in com-
mercial law, to practicing lawyers and businessmen in the field, or even
to the judges and legislators who have ultimate jurisdiction over the
laws of secured credit and bankruptcy.1 87 The articles have no link to
185 H. Kripke, Memorandum of May 10, 1984, Submitted to a Panel of the
S.E.C.'s Third Major Issues Conference (June 29, 1984) [on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review]; see also United States v. Gleneagles Investment Co., 565
F. Supp. 556, 574-75 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (passing loan proceeds of mortgages through
borrowers to holding company that used them to buy out stockholders held to be fraud-
ulent conveyance); In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 348-49 (N.D. Ill.
1964) (secured loan used to effect illegal redemption of stock and to defraud prior
unsecured creditors), rev'd on juris. grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967); cf. In re Greenbrook Carpet Co., 722 F.2d 659, 661 (11th
Cir. 1984) (transferring proceeds of secured loan to stockholders in exchange for per-
sonal note held not to be fraudulent conveyance). See generally Business Frauds: Their
Perpetration, Detection, and Redress: A Symposium of the Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law, 20 Bus. LAw. 83, 91-93 (1964) (statement of Sidney
Krause) (use of borrowing to defraud creditors).
18 See Shad, The Leveraging of America, Wall St. J., June 8, 1984, at 28, col. 4;
Surge of Leveraged Buyouts Could Cause More Companies to Fail, SEC Chief Warns,
Wall St. J., June 8, 1984, at 8, col. 2; see also Leveraged Buyouts Are Encountering
More Resistance from Lenders, Investors, Wall St. J., July 25, 1984, at 18, col. 1.
18I See Summers, The Future of Economics in Legal Education: Limits and Con-
straints, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 337, 351 (1983):
There are, however, two concerns that in my view may be of special
significance: (1) the likelihood that lawyers and judges will not be able to
use or to assess economic analysis accurately or efficiently, and (2) the risk
that its introduction may find its way into judicial opinions in cases in
which it is highly unlikely that the litigants will be able to understand
why the court decided as it did. We already have evidence that even ex-
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the reality of secured transactions, and their abstractions are untested
by any empirical research. Both enthusiasts and nonenthusiasts for law
and economics have cautioned that policy recommendations based on
economic theories must be tied to empirical studies and that these stud-
ies will not be easy."'
I strongly believe that academicians in the field of commercial law
must get some practical feel for the field and for the role of financing in
our systems of manufacturing and distribution. This will not come from
reading appellate cases or the writings of academic economists who un-
successfully try to describe and reduce to formulae an intensely practi-
cal field. It could come from participation in the work of the American
Bar Association's Committee on Commercial Financial Services and by
reading practice-oriented material in such journals as The Business
Lawyer, The Commercial Law Journal, and the NCFA Journal.
There is preeminently a need for the old goal of legal realism: to get
beyond appellate opinions into trial records and beyond those records
into life itself. The academic and abstract coloring of the articles dis-
cussed here belies the frequent assertion that law and economics is the
successor to legal realism.1 89
law-professors sitting on the bench can have a great deal of difficulty in
applying economic analysis. It also seems likely that ordinary lay people
will not be able to understand and to feel the force of many justifying
reasons given by judges in the name of economic analysis. What is at stake
here is nothing less than a basic precondition for respect of the law. Again,
one must await the accumulation of further evidence before passing final
judgment.
See also Gellhorn & Robinson, The Role of Economic Analysis in Legal Education, 33
J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 251 (1983) ("Lawyers tend to be less comfortable with abstract
models: they are discomforted by the oversimplification of a complex social reality.");
Trebilcock, The Prospects of "Law and Economics": A Canadian Perspective, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 288, 292 (1983) (economic analysis too indeterminate for .courts to
apply).
188 Professor Kornhauser, who is not merely a lawyer practicing economics but
also a scholar with academic credentials in both fields, has sounded a note that trans-
lates at a minimum into a caution against the overzealous application of law-and-eco-
nomics techniques:
Careful scrutiny of the descriptive claim [i.e., that the law is in fact effi-
cient in an economic sense], like scrutiny of the normative claim [i.e., that
the law should be efficient in that sense], therefore raises grave doubt as to
its validity. These doubts call into question these claims as a justification
for the enterprise of law and economics.
Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 591, 634 (1980).
189 See Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
905, 905 (1980); Kitch, supra note 20, at 184; M. Schwartz, Economics in Legal Edu-
cation, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 366 (1983). In a conversation with the author on
April 4, 1985, Professor Jackson expressed the view that law and economics should not
be considered a successor to legal realism.
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If these articles are indicative, one may well conclude that law and
economics has "peaked out" and will prove to have been just a legal fad
without continuing promise.' Others, of course, will disagree.191 The
truth may be that too much is being attempted too early. Perhaps these
articles were written before economic tools were ready for the task.
Professor Summers has stated that "[t]he limits of economic analysis of
law as well as its important uses will become better understood in the
immediate future. There is already a growing literature on the limita-
tions of positive economics as a source of models for the prediction and
explanation of legal phenomena." 92 If this expectation of greater un-
derstanding is correct, then, while I still grade these articles low for
accomplishment, I can grade them high for effort, and applaud them as
examples of necessary failures along the way.
190 See Horwitz, supra note 189, at 905. Since Professor Horwitz is a member of
the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, see supra note 14, a group competing with
law and economics for the hearts and minds of legal academe, his conclusion is not
surprising.
191 See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 20, at 196.
192 Summers, supra note 187, at 340 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
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